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PROTECTION AND EMERGING
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I.

R. McMANIs**

INTRODUCTION

D

URING the past decade the global marketplace witnessed a virtual explosion in emerging computer technologies, ranging
from new hardware developments, such as CD-ROM and optical
scanner technology, to new software and multimedia products, and
to rapidly expanding computer networks and digital communications technology. Collectively, these developments promise to produce a new global information infrastructure, or "information
superhighway."'
* This Article is available at the Villanova Law Review home page at http://
vls.law.vill.edu/academic/jd/ournals/law-review/Volume-41/.
** Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis; B.A., 1964, Birmingham-Southern College; MA. (Philosophy), J.D., 1972, Duke University.
The author would like to thank Dr. Nuno Carvalho, J.S.D., Washington University and Ms. Sophia Hirakuri, J.S.D. candidate, Washington University, for their
valuable assistance in preparing this Article for publication.
1. The emerging national information infrastructure (NIl) and its global
equivalent, the GI1, have been described by more than one author as the product
of convergence-of technologies, markets, and law or public policy. See, e.g., Fred
H. Cate, Information Issues: Intellectual Property, Privacy, Integrity, Interoperabiliy, and
the Economics of Information, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 5, 11-14 (1995) (remarks of Brian
Kahin) (describing NII as product of technological, market, and legal or policy
convergence); Andrew Christie, ReconceptualisingCopyright in the DigitalEra, 17 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REv. 522, 522-23 (1995) (discussing convergence of information
technologies); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Access to the National Information Infrastructure,
30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 51, 52-53 (1995) (noting that law "emerges from human
cultures, and the NI represents a convergence of five different cultures: Telephone systems, broadcast media, textual media, personal computing, and the
Internet").
The term "information superhighway" has perhaps correctly been called the
"mother of all bad metaphors." John P. Barlow, Keynote Address, Symposium of Fundamental Rights on the Information Superhighway, 1994 ANN. SuRv. Am. L. 355, 360.
Barlow, however, (who in another of his articles, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework
for Rethinking Patents and Copyrights in the DigitalAge (Everthing You Know about Intellectual Property is Wrong), WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84, describes himself as a retired
cattle rancher, lyricist for the Grateful Dead and co-founder and executive chair of
the Electronic Frontier Foundation) would undoubtedly agree that to understand
the new, one must inevitably make comparisons with the known and that even a
bad metaphor is better than its bureaucratic equivalent-in this case, "information
infrastructure." Id.

(207)
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Not surprisingly, during precisely the same decade international intellectual property protection suddenly emerged from the
obscurity of an arcane legal subspecialty and gained sufficient notoriety to periodically dominate the headlines. Ten years ago, perhaps even a practicing attorney might have had trouble identifying
exactly what was meant by "intellectual property"2 or what international legal protection is available for it.3 Today, on the other
hand, even a moderately well-informed layperson has likely heard
the term "intellectual property" bandied about in the news media
and may even understand that international intellectual property
protection has been a key topic in both multilateral and bilateral
trade negotiations, such as the long stalled but eventually successful
For a discussion of how metaphors can be useful in defining the matrix of
rights and responsibilities in networked communities, see Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Metaphorsfor UnderstandingRights and Responsibilities in Network Communities:. Print
Shops, Barons, Sheriffs and Bureaucracies,VIL. INFO. L. CHRON., www.law.vill.edu/
chron (discussion paper, Oct. 15, 1992). For a caution against becoming trapped
in legal metaphors, see David R. Johnson & Kevin A. Marks, Mapping ElectronicData
Communications into ExistingLegal Metaphors: Should We Let Our Conscience (and Our
Contract) Be Our Guide?, 38 ViL. L. Ruv. 487 (1993).
The most dangerous metaphor in the entire debate over intellectual property
protection on the emerging global information superhighway may be one that
often goes unrecognized as a metaphor-namely the term "intellectual property."
For a further discussion of the meaning of the term "intellectual property," see
infra note 2 and accompanying text. For a critique of the concept of intellectual
property, see infra notes 13, 312-36 and accompanying text.
The recent literature on the information superhighway is voluminous. For a
readable collection of articles discussing the economic, business, legal, political,
cultural and social aspects of the information revolution, see THE INFORMATION
REVOLUTION (Donald Altschiller ed., 1995). For a somewhat more irreverent introduction to the current state of virtual reality, see DiNTr W. MOORE, THE EMPEROR'S
VIRTUAL CLOTHES: THE NAKED TRUTH ABOUT THE INTERNET CULTURE 1 (1995).

2. In the United States, intellectual property is now generally understood (by
lawyers, at least) to mean anything protected by the federal law of patents and
copyrights, the federal and state law of trademarks and tradenames, and the state
law of trade secrets and ideas. Intellectual property law could also be said to include two specialized sui generis federal statutes protecting semiconductor chip designs and new plant varieties, and a more amorphous body of state common law

protecting a variety of commercially valuable intangibles, such as news, ideas,
ephemeral performances and the publicity rights of celebrities and others.
Other countries conceptualize ihtellectual property somewhat differently. For
example, several forms of intellectual property common in Europe and other parts
of the world-namely, copyright-like industrial design protection, utility model (or
petty patent) protection and "neighboring rights" protection for performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations-have no exact counterpart in U.S. intellectual property law, but are recognized in various international
intellectual property conventions. For a detailed further discussion of the Paris
and Berne Conventions, see infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text. For a discussion of some of the international difficulties that different concepts of intellectual
property create, see infra notes 293-300 and accompanying text.
3. For a discussion of the various international conventions dealing with intellectual property protection, see infra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
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Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, conducted
under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)-now the World Trade Organization (WTO) 4-and the
seemingly endless bilateral trade negotiations that the United States
conducts with some of its major trading partners, particularly those
in East Asia. 5
This Article will examine recent developments in the international protection of intellectual property rights and consider what
impact these developments will have on emerging computer technologies and the protection of intellectual property rights on the
global information superhighway. The Article will also examine the
impact that emerging computer technologies and the global information superhighway will likely have on the international intellectual property law of the future.
Part II of this Article will examine the so-called TRIPS agreement-formally known as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit
Goods (TRIPS) 6-which was hammered out during the course of
the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiation. The TRIPS
agreement represents a milestone in international intellectual
property protection. For the first time, a comprehensive set of international minimum standards for the protection of intellectual

4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signatureOct. 30, 1947,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, reprinted in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFs
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DocUMENTs (1969). The term
GATT is generally used to refer both to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade and to the rules, organization and trading system that evolved under the
General Agreement. William J. Davey, The W1'O/GATT World Trading System: An
Overview, in 1 PIERRE PESCATORE ET AL., HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATI DisPuTE SETTLEENT 7 n.1 (1995).
For a description of the origins and organizational structure of GATT and its
evolution into the World Trade Organization (WTO), see infra notes 7-23 and accompanying text. For an overview of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations, see Symposium: Uruguay Round-GA7T/WTO, 29 INT'L LAw. 335
AND TRADE,

(1995). For the results of the Uruguay Round, see Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in THE RESULTS

OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS (GATT Secretariat ed., 1994) [hereinafter Final

Act].
5. For a discussion of the results of recent bilateral trade negotiations be-

tween the United States and its East Asian trading partners, see infta note 22 and
accompanying text.
6. Final Act, supra note 4, Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods [hereinafter
TRIPS agreement].

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41: p. 207

property rights and a detailed international dispute settlement pro7
cess was established.
Part III of this Article will examine the potential impact of the
TRIPS agreement on the ongoing international debate over computer program "interoperability." Even before the TRIPS agreement was adopted, the European Community Directive on the
Legal Protection of Computer Programs8 and a number of judicial
decisions in the United States came to similar, but not identical,

conclusions on the two specific issues that have dominated the debate-namely the scope of copyright protection for a computer
program's interface specifications and the legality of reverse engi-

neering which may be necessary to achieve interoperability among
computer programs. To the extent that differences exist, both issues could become the subject of WTO dispute resolution.
Finally, Part IV of this Article will examine two recent initiatives
designed to enhance intellectual property protection on the emerging global information superhighway--namely, the newly adopted
European Directive for the Legal Protection of Databases 9 and the
final report ("White Paper") on Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure, issued by the Clinton administration's Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights. 10 These two
initiatives are particularly important because they apparently represent a coordinated effort on the part of the United States and the

European Union to fashion a new multilateral agreement for the
protection of intellectual property on the global information superhighway; yet both proposals create the potential for conflict with
either the TRIPS agreement itself or the associated GATT/WTO

agreement."
7. See generallyJeromeH. Reichman, UniversalMinimum Standards of Intellectual
Property Protectionunder the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAw. 345
(1995) [hereinafter Universal Minimum Standards] (conveying comprehensive picture of substantive provisions of TRIPS agreement).
8. Council Directive 91/250 of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1991 O.J. (L122/42) [hereinafter EC Directive].
9. Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L77) [hereinafter
Database Directive].
10. BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLEG
TUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF
THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995) [hereinafter
WHITE PAPER].

11. For a discussion of the proposed new multilateral agreement, see infra
notes 231-34 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the possible conflicts with
the TRIPS and/or GATT/WTO agreement, see infra notes 308-10 and accompanying text.
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In evaluating any proposals for enhanced intellectual property
protection, it is important to keep in mind that most intellectual
property issues raised by rapidly developing technologies and new
media are not themselves new.' 2 Technologies and media have
been emerging at an exponential rate in the industrialized world
for at least two centuries. The perennial challenge for intellectual
property law is first to determine whether any new or additional
intellectual property protection is warranted for newly emerging
technologies and media. If so, the next challenge is to determine
what level of intellectual property protection will be sufficient to
encourage innovation without being so overbroad as to stifle either
competition or public access to and use of the new technologies
and media.
This Article concludes that the one genuinely new international intellectual property issue posed by digital technology and
the emerging global information superhighway is how to enforce
territorially limited intellectual property rights in what is rapidly becoming an integrated global economy. The emergence of digital
technology and global computer networks is rapidly undermining
the whole concept of territorially limited intellectual property
rights, and to a certain extent, the concept of intellectual property
itself.' 3
II.

THE TRIPS AGREEMENT

The current international debate over intellectual property
protection is largely a consequence of a mounting international
trade deficit in the United States during the 1980s. Although the
United States has long been committed to the principle of free international trade, each succeeding administration over the past
decade has faced intense domestic political pressure to protect
American businesses against the perceived cause of the deficit:
4
growing foreign competition at home and abroad.'
12. See, e.g., Trotter Hardy, The ProperLegal Regime for "Cyberspace,"55 U. Prrr.

L. REv. 993 (1994); Johnson & Marks, supra note 1 at 487 (attempting to distinguish old and new legal issues arising in cyberspace).
13. For further discussions of the effect of emerging digital technology and
global computer networks on intellectual property, see infra notes 312-36 and accompanying text.
14. In 1985, in particular, the U.S. trade deficit is said to have skyrocketed.
Judith H. Bello & Mary E. Footer note that as a result:
Over 300 trade bills were introduced in the Congress that year, many of
them protectionist. The second Reagan administration confronted
strong political pressure to close the U.S. market against imports from
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Rather than simply succumbing to demands for higher trade
barriers to reduce foreign competition in the United States, Republican and Democratic administrations alike chose to respond instead to the growing barrage of complaints from American
companies doing business abroad that their sales in foreign markets
were being undermined by a combination of inadequate foreign
patent protection, wholesale "piracy" of copyrighted works, massive
counterfeiting of brand name goods and systematic theft of American trade secrets. 15 Because exports having significant intellectual
property content now account for over twenty-five percent of total
American exports, as compared with only ten percent at mid-century, securing more effective intellectual property protection for
U.S. goods in foreign markets should have a significant effect in
16
reducing the U.S. trade deficit.
Accordingly, the Reagan administration specifically sought to
improve intellectual property protection for U.S. goods in foreign
markets as a part of its overall strategy to strengthen U.S. competitiveness in world markets.' 7 In the Trade and Tariff Act of 198418
and again in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988,19 Congress endorsed that strategy. Improved global intellecforeign markets that were not reciprocally open to U.S. exports. The hue
and cry was to obtain a "level playing field."
Judith H. Bellow & Mary E. Footer, Preface, 29 INT'L LAW. 335, 336 (1995).
15. For a detailed discussion of U.S. industry concerns over the problem of
"piracy" in overseas markets, and the U.S. government's response to those concerns, see R. MICHAEL GADBAW & TIMOTHYJ. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? (1988). Unlike piracy on the
high-seas, however, such "piracy" is not an international crime.
16. Id. at 4, Chart 1.1. Revenues lost by U.S. companies as a result of "piracy"
have been estimated to be as much as $25 billion per year-about 15% of the U.S.
trade deficit. Id. at 3. But cf.Frederick M. Abbott, WTO Dispute Settlement and the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW AND THE GATT-WTO DisPuTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann ed., forthcoming 1996) (noting that at least one of major studies used
by United States as primary evidence of need for higher levels of intellectual property protection, namely U.S. International Trade Commission, Pub. L. No. 2065,
Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and the Effect on U.S. Industry
and Trade (1988), was based on highly suspect methodology). According to Abbott, data from this report was collected by means of a questionnaire soliciting
information on losses; the information was not verified. The collected information
was thereafter extrapolated on the basis of admittedly invalid statistical
assumptions.

17. Abbott, supra note 16, at 39 (citing President's Commission on Industrial
Competitiveness, Global Competition: The New Reality (1985)).
18. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 501, 98 Stat. 2948
(1984) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (1994)).
19. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994)) [hereinafter OTCA].
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tual property protection thus became a bipartisan cornerstone of
U.S. international trade policy.
Invoking the enhanced powers conferred by the latter piece of
legislation, the United States Trade Representative ("USTR")
launched a two-pronged strategy for achieving more effective intellectual property protection for U.S. goods in foreign markets. In
bilateral trade negotiations, the USTR utilized a provision of U.S.
trade law, called "Special 301 ,"20 to threaten particularly vulnerable
trading partners with trade sanctions if they did not strengthen
their domestic intellectual property law and enforcement efforts.
At the same time, the USTR seized on the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations to push for a multilateral agreement establishing international minimum standards for intellectual
21
property protection.
Today, scarcely a decade later, the United States seems to have
achieved its initial objectives. Individual trading partners, such as
Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, have all
dutifully taken at least some steps to strengthen their domestic intellectual property law and enforcement efforts. 22 At the same
time, the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations came to

20. OTCA § 1303, 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1994), is commonly called "Special 301,"
because it is, in effect, a spin-off of § 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411
(1994), which declares that foreign government acts, policies or practices that violate trade agreements with the United States, or that are unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory, and that burden or restrict U.S. commerce, may be
subjected to trade sanctions. The OTCA § 1301 transferred from the President to
the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) the authority to investigate such practices
and determine what U.S. action is appropriate in response. Although § 301 itself
includes within its definition of unreasonable acts, policies or practices, any that
deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411(d) (3) (B) (i) (II), "Special 301," specifically directs the USTR to identify
countries that deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights or deny fair and equitable market access to U.S. persons that rely upon intellectual property protection.
For a detailed discussion of the impact of "Special 301" on the intellectual
property law of East Asia, see IntellectualProperty in EastAsia, 13 UCLA PAc. BAS. L.J.
1 (1994). For some of the individual articles in this special issue, see infra note 22.
21. See Bello & Footer, supra note 14, at 336-37.
22. See, e.g., Paul C. B. Liu, US. Industy's Influence on IntellectualProperty Negotiations and Special 301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BAS. L.J. 87 (1994); Sang-Hyun Song &
Seong-Ki Kim, The Impact of MultilateralTradeNegotiations on IntellectualProperty Laws
in Korea, 13 UCLA PAC. BAS. L.J. 118 (1994); Chung-Sen Yang &JudyY. C. Chang,
Recent Developments in IntellectualProperty Law in the Republic of China, 13 UCLA PAC.
BAS. L.J. 70 (1994); Jianyang Yu, Protection of Intellectual Property in the P.R.C.: Progress, Problems, and Proposals, 13 UCLA PAc. BAS. L.J. 140 (1994).
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a successful conclusion, producing not only the TRIPS agreement,
23
but also a new GATT/WTO dispute settlement process.
Although TRIPS gives developing countries a five to ten year
grace period in which to bring their intellectual property laws and
enforcement efforts into compliance,2 4 the agreement will eventually require all member countries of the newly-formed WTO (the
successor to GATT) to meet: (1) the substantive standards concerning the availability, scope and use of intellectual property rights,
enumerated in Part II of TRIPS; (2) the civil and criminal enforcement obligations, including border measures, enumerated in Part
III of TRIPS; and (3) the procedural requirements governing the
acquisition and maintenance of intellectual property rights, enumerated in Part IV of TRIPS. As a supplement to these detailed
minimum standards for the intellectual property laws of individual
GATr/WTO member countries, Part V of the TRIPS agreement incorporates by reference a separate Understanding on Dispute Settlement which was also hammered out during the Uruguay Round
of multilateral trade negotiations.2 5 Incorporation of these dispute
prevention and settlement provisions may turn out to be the single
most important contribution of the TRIPS agreement. To understand why this is so, it is first necessary to examine the substantive
intellectual property standards contained in TRIPS.
A.

Substantive Intellectual Property Standards

The TRIPS agreement is unquestionably a milestone in international intellectual property law. Prior to TRIPS, there simply
were no universally acknowledged international minimum standards for intellectual property protection. To be sure, international agreements on intellectual property protection date as far
23. For a detailed discussion of this dispute settlement process, see infra notes
92-100 and accompanying text.
24. See TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, arts. 65-156. Article 65 of TRIPS gives
industrialized countries a period of one year following the date of entry into force
of the companion agreement establishing the WTO to apply the provisions of
TRIPS and gives developing countries an additional four years. Article 66 gives
least-developed countries a period of ten years, subject to further possible extensions, to apply most provisions of TRIPS.
25. Article 64 of the TRIPS agreement states that the "provisions of Articles
XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the dispute settlement
understanding [Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes] shall apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes
under this Agreement except as otherwise specifically provided herein." TRIPS
agreement, supra note 6, art. 64. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 is legally distinct from, but incorporates GATT. Final Act, supra note 4, art.
11(4) and Annex IA. The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes is contained in the Final Act. Id. at Annex 2.
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back as the two "Great Conventions" of the late nineteenth century-the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (the "Paris Convention")2 6 and the 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (the "Berne
Convention") 27 Neither of these two conventions, however, succeeded in establishing universally accepted international minimum
standards for intellectual property protection, nor did they contain
effective international dispute resolution procedures. 28 Indeed, as
more newly independent developing countries became members of
the two Great Conventions after World War II, even the amendment process, which essentially requires unanimity among the
member countries, eventually broke down. 29
26. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
13 U.S.T. 2, 828 U.N.T.S. 107, as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference,
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 303 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
27. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept.
9, 1886, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter Berne Convention].
28. Article 28 of the Paris Convention and Article 33 of the Berne Convention
provide that any dispute between member countries may be brought before the
International Court of Justice. Berne Convention, supra note 27, art. 33; Paris
Convention, supra note 26, art. 28. Each article, however, allows any country acceding to the Convention to declare upon accession that it does not consider itself
bound by this provision. See generally 1 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,
AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION § 143, at 237-40
(1975); S. RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY

ARarIsTc WoRKs: 1886-1986 (1987) (noting that Article 33 of Berne Convention only binds parties concerned in dispute and those parties will be bound by
court's jurisdiction only if no reservations are made).
29. Article 27 of the Berne Convention explicitly states that subject to Article
26, which applies to the amendment of Articles 22 to 26 (concerned with the organizational structure of the Berne Union), any revision of the Berne Convention
"shall require the unanimity of the votes cast." Berne Convention, supra note 27,
art. 27. Although the Paris Convention contains no explicit requirement of unanimity, except in Article 13(6) in the 1883 version, which requires unanimity for
increases in the budget of its international bureau, it is nevertheless said to be an
established rule in conferences of revision of the Paris Union "that all member
countries of the Union represented at the Conference must vote affirmatively for
the adoption of any amendment of the Convention." See 1 LADAS, supra note 28,
§ 86, at 135-38.
Largely as a result of the unanimity rule, the Paris Convention was last revised
in 1967, while the Berne Convention was last revised in 1971. Berne Convention,
supra note 27; Paris Convention, supra note 26. The most notable post-World War
II international intellectual property law development came in 1967, with the creation of a single international agency, the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), to administer the two Great Conventions, as well as a number of other
international intellectual property agreements. 1 LADAS, supra note 28, § 92, at
145-47. Gridlock over the amendment of the two Great Conventions led to the
decision by the United States to inject intellectual property protection into the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
AND
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The Paris Convention merely obliges its member countries to
offer "national [i.e., nondiscriminatory] treatment" to the nationals
of other member countries with respect to any industrial property
protection that the member country chooses to provide for its own
citizens.30 It also establishes an international priority system for the
registration of industrial property.3 1 The Paris Convention obviously envisions that member countries will offer some form of
"industrial property" protection, which Article 1(2) of the Paris
Convention defines as the protection of "patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications of source or appellations of origin, and the repression of
unfair competition."3 2 However, the Paris Convention establishes
little in the way of actual international minimum standards for in33
dustrial property protection.
The Berne Convention goes a step further than the Paris Convention, establishing certain minimum standards for copyright protection, in addition to obliging its members to accord national
treatment to the nationals of other member countries.3 4 Many
30. Paris Convention, supra note 26, art. 2.
31. Id. art. 4.
32. Id. art. 1(2). Article 1(3) goes on to state that "[i] ndustrial property shall
be understood in the broadest sense." For the complete text of Article 1(3), see
infra note 168.
33. Until recently, international minimum standards for intellectual property
protection were not necessary. For a further discussion of international minimum
standards for intellectual property, see infra notes 80, 81, 314 and accompanying
text. The principle of national treatment and an international priority system promoted international trade far more effectively than had previously been the case.
Prior to the Paris Convention, the intellectual property of foreign nationals was
either altogether denied protection or protected only on the basis of material reciprocity. For a discussion of material reciprocity, see infra notes 78-79, 209-10, 21821, 297-302 and accompanying text.
Virtually the only minimum substantive standards spelled out in the Paris Convention are not concerned with industrial property as such, but rather with unfair
competition. Article 10 ' states that member countries are bound to assure nationals of member countries effective protection against unfair competition. Paris
Convention, supra note 26, art. 10 ' . Article 10 ' defines unfair competition as any
act contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matter, including, but
not limited to, acts of passing off, disparagement or deceptive advertising. Id. Article 39 of the TRIPS agreement adds the protection of undisclosed information to
the list of obligatory forms of protection against unfair competition. TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, art. 39. For a further discussion of Article 39 of the TRIPS
agreement, see infra notes 55, 176-78, 216, 225, 335 and accompanying text.
34. Berne Convention, supra note 27, art. 2. In keeping with the European
concept of intellectual property, the Berne Convention does not contain any provisions dealing with the "neighboring rights" of performers, producers of phonograms or broadcast organizations. For a discussion of the European concept of
intellectual property, see supra note 2 and accompanying text. Rather, these
"neighboring rights" are dealt with in a separate international agreement, the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phono-
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countries, including the United States, objected to some of the minimum standards and refused tojoin the Berne Convention. Eventually these countries opted to adhere to the more minimal "national

treatment" obligations contained in the Universal Copyright Convention of 1952.85 Only in 1988, as a part of its new found interest
in "harmonizing" (i.e., strengthening) intellectual property protection around the world, did the United States finally grudgingly en-

act legislation adhering to the Berne Convention and purporting to
bring U.S. copyright law into compliance with Berne Convention
36
standards.
The TRIPS agreement builds upon the foundation of the two
Great Conventions. Article 9 of TRIPS specifically imposes an obligation on all GATI/WTO members to adhere to all but one of the
substantive provisions of the Berne Convention in the grant of domestic copyright protection.3 7 Article 2 of TRIPS imposes a somewhat analogous obligation on GAT'/WTO members to comply
with the substantive provisions of the Paris Convention.3 8 In addition, Part II of the TRIPS agreement creates new international minimum standards for the protection of various forms of intellectual
property-including copyright and related rights, trademarks, geograms and Broadcast Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter
Rome Convention] and are thus not subject to the Berne Convention's national
treatment requirement. The Paris and Berne Conventions themselves contain
some limited exceptions to the principle of national treatment. Berne Convention, supra note 27, art. 3(1); Paris Convention, supra note 26, arts. 2, 3. For a
discussion of how the new TRIPS agreement deals with these pre-existing exceptions to national treatment, see infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
35. Universal Copyright Convention, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216 U.N.T.S. 134 (1952),
revisedJuly 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178.
36. Indeed, so grudging was the United States' adherence to the Berne Convention that some doubted whether the Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988), did in fact harmonize U.S. copyright law with all of the requirements of the Berne Convention. This suspicion was
amply confirmed two years later when Congress further amended the U.S. copyright law, claiming for a second time to have now brought U.S. copyright law into
complete harmony with the Berne Convention. Judicial Improvements Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990); Title VI (Visual Artists Rights Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990)); Title VII (Architectural
Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990)).
37. Specifically, Article 9 of TRIPS states that member countries are to comply
with Artides 1-21 (excepting only the Article 6 obligation to protect moral rights)
and the Appendix of the 1971 revision of the Berne Convention.
38. TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, art. 2 (stating that with respect to Parts II,
III and IV of TRIPS, "Members shall comply with Articles 1-12 and 19 of the Paris
Convention (1967)"). For a summary of Parts II, III and IV of TRIPS, see supra
text following note 26. For a discussion of Article 2 of TRIPS, see infra notes 166,
222-25 and accompanying text.
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graphical indications, industrial designs, patents, lay-out designs of
integrated circuits and undisclosed information.3 9
Article 3 of the TRIPS agreement in effect requires that the
general Paris-Berne obligation to accord "national treatment," i.e.,
"treatment" no less favorable than a member country accords its
own nationals, be extended to all forms of intellectual property protection required by Part II of TRIPS. 4° Article 4, in turn, imposes
on member countries granting more than the required minimum
protection for such intellectual property a complementary obligation, with but four limited exceptions, to provide "most-favored-nation" treatment-i.e., to immediately and unconditionally accord to
the nationals of all member countries any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted to the nationals of any one member
41
country.
Only two provisions in the TRIPS agreement, however, specifically address the protection of computer programs and databases.
Article 10 states that: "Computer programs, whether in source [i.e.,
human readable] or object [i.e., machine readable] code, shall be
protected as literary works under the Berne Convention." 42 Article
10 goes on to provide that "[c]ompilations of data or other material, whether in machine readable or other form, which by reason

of the selection or arrangement of their contents constitute intel39. Article 1 states that "the term intellectual property, refers to all categories
of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 to 7 of Part II." TRIPS
agreement, supra note 6, art. 1. The seven categories of intellectual property
treated in Part II are: (1) copyright and related rights; (2) trademarks; (3) geographical indications; (4) industrial designs; (5) patents; (6) lay-out designs (topographies) of integrated circuits; and (7) undisclosed information. Id.
40. This obligation is expressly made subject to pre-existing exceptions contained in the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention and
the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, May 26, 1989,
28 I.L.M. 1483 (1989). For a discussion of the Rome Convention, see supranote 34
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in
Respect of Integrated Circuits and its de facto supersession by Articles 35-39 of the
TRIPS agreement, see infra note 78 and accompanying text.
41. Among the four listed exceptions are two that will be of particular relevance in Part IV of this Article-namely those for any advantage, favor, privilege or
immunity accorded by a member (1) in accordance with provisions in the Berne
or Rome Convention authorizing that the treatment accorded be a function not of
national treatment but of the treatment accorded in another country; or (2) in
respect of the rights of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcast organizations not provided under TRIPS. For a discussion of what rights are granted to
producers of sound recordings, see infra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
42. TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, art. 10. For a discussion of the significance of the reference to source code and object code, see infra notes 138, 177 and
accompanying text. For the significance of the reference to the Berne Convention, see infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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lectual creations shall be protected as such." 43 Finally, Article 10
concludes with a caveat that such protection shall not extend to the
data or material itself, just as Article 9 specifies that copyright protection in general is to extend only to expressions and not to ideas,
procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as
such. 44 Article 11, a much narrower provision, requires members
to provide copyright holders with an exclusive right to prohibit the
commercial rental to the public of originals or copies of computer
45
programs.
Not surprisingly, neither of these articles is directly relevant to
the ongoing "interoperability" debate over the scope (as opposed
merely to the availability) of copyright protection for computer programs or to the emerging debate over the scope of protection for
intellectual property on the information superhighway. The primary aim of the TRIPS agreement, after all, is to compel rapidly
developing countries to provide certain widely accepted minimum
levels of intellectual property protection, not to address the more
complex policy questions that currently perplex and divide the in46
dustrialized world itself.
The only provision in the TRIPS agreement giving any indication of the scope of copyright protection to be accorded computer
programs or compilations of data is the very general statement in
Article 13 that members "shall confine limitations or exceptions to
exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the right holder."4 7 While Article 13 is
seemingly broad enough to exclude all but the narrowest limitations or exceptions to the various exclusive rights enumerated in
43. TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, art. 10. For a discussion of the constraints
this language puts on the protection of databases, see infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
44. TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, art. 10. For a discussion of the significance of these limitations on the protection of computer programs and compilations of data, see infra notes 120-35, 214-17 and accompanying text.
45. TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, art. 11. This provision, like its analogue
in the U.S. copyright law, 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1) (A) (1994), in effect places a limitation on the "first sale" doctrine. For a discussion of the first sale doctrine and
limitations thereon, see infra notes 270, 277-78 and accompanying text.
46. For a discussion of the divisions within the industrialized world on the
question of interoperability, see infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text and the
text following note 151. For a discussion of potential conflicts over the scope of
intellectual property protection on the emerging global information superhighway, see infra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
47. TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, art. 13. The language of Article 13 is
taken from Article 9 of the Berne Convention, which is solely concerned, however,
with the reproduction right and not with exclusive rights generally.
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the Berne Convention, the language also evokes, in some minds at
least, a broad principle of "fair use," 48 such as that codified in sec49
tion 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act.

The Berne Convention itself contains no provisions explicitly
addressing the scope of exclusive rights in computer programs or
compilations of data. In fact, prior to TRIPS, there was some doubt
over whether the Berne Convention applied to either type of
work. 50 A primary objective of Article 10 of the TRIPS agreement
was to clarify what had not been clear before-namely that computer programs, whether in source or object-code, are indeed to be
protected as literary works under the Berne Convention, and that
compilations of data or other material, whether in machine readable or other form, which by reason of the selection or arrangement
of their contents constitute intellectual creations and are to be protected as such.
The Berne Convention enumerates a variety of exclusive rights
that are to vest in literary and artistic works, 51 but the actual scope
of those exclusive rights varies considerably among member countries of the Berne Convention. For example, the Berne Convention
establishes no international norms for distinguishing between comprehensive "nonliteral" copying of protected expression and the
permissible use of the unprotected facts or ideas being expressed,
or between fragmentary literal copying and the fair use of quotations from copyrighted works, or for determining the scope of protection to be given functional or factual works, such as computer
programs and databases. Indeed, the absence of any such international norms, particularly where computer programs and compilations of data are concerned, was precisely what stimulated the
European Community Directive on the Legal Protection of Com48. Paul E. Geller, IntellectualProperty in the Global Marketplace: Impact of TRIPS

Dispute Settlements?, 29

INT'L LAW.

99, 112 (1995).

49. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). For a discussion of reverse engineering of computer programs as a fair use, see infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, The Know-How Gap in the TRIPS Agreement:
My Software Fared Badly, and What Are the Solutions, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & Er. L.J.
763, 774 (1995) [hereinafter Reichman, Know-How Gap] (discussing broad language of Berne Convention in defining "artistic works").
51. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 27, art. 8 (right of translation), art.
9 (right of reproduction), art. 11 (right of public performance), art. 12 (right of
adaptation, arrangement and other alteration). For a comparison with the exclusive rights enumerated in U.S. copyright law, see infra note 246 and accompanying
text. Notably absent from the Berne Convention is any explicit reference to an
exclusive distribution right. For the significance of this omission and current efforts to add an exclusive right to distribute works by transmission, see infra notes
233, 268-78 and accompanying text.
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puter Programs and the more recent Directive on the Legal Protec52
tion of Databases.
While the TRIPS *agreementmakes it clear that computer programs and databases are to be protected as literary works under the
Berne Convention, TRIPS is far less explicit about the availability
and scope of patent or trade secret protection for software-related
technology.53 Arguably, the requirement in Article 27 that patents

be made available "for any inventions, whether products or
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new,
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application"
is broad enough to require at least some degree of patent protection for at least some types of software-related inventions.54 Likewise, Article 39, governing the protection of undisclosed
information, appears to be broad enough to require a certain degree of trade secret protection for at least some computer programs
and databases. 55 However, the precise scope of the patent or trade
secret protection that must be afforded software technology under
TRIPS remains unclear.
A more fundamental weakness in the TRIPS agreement is that
it implicitly recognizes, but deals only imperfectly with what has
been described as a growing crisis in-or
Balkanization of-the
classic bipolar structure of the Paris-Berne regime.5 6 The two Great

Conventions, as we have seen, divide the intellectual property universe into two conceptually distinct categories, namely "industrial
property" and "literary and artistic works." 57 This bipolar structure,

however, is beginning to collapse under the pressure of both cen58
tripedal and centrifugal forces.

52. For a discussion of these two Directives, see infra notes 145-50, 189-209
and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Reichman, Know-How Gap, supra note 50, at 767-73, 784-85 (noting that TRIPS effectively ignores software patents and program related
inventions).
54. For a discussion of Article 27, see infra notes 164-71 and accompanying
text.
55. The text of Article 39(1) provides that: "In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition as provided in Article 10' of the Paris
Convention (1967), Members shall protect undisclosed information in accordance
with paragraph 2 and data submitted to governments or governmental agencies in
accordance with paragraph 3." For the text of Article 39(2), see infta text accompanying note 177. For a discussion of Article 39, see infra notes 176-80, 216, 225
and accompanying text.
56. Geller, supra note 48, at 103.
57. For a discussion of the Paris and Berne Conventions, see supra notes 26-27
and accompanying text.
58. See generalyJeromeH. Reichman, Chartingthe Collapse of the Patent-Copyright
Dichotomy: Premisesfor a Restructured InternationalIntellectualProperty System, 13 CAR-
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A growing number of hybrid intellectual products, such as
computer programs, have been absorbed into the Paris-Berne regime and consequently threaten to collapse its bipolar structure
from within.5 9 Because computer programs function both as literary works and as machine parts, they inevitably blur the historic line
of demarcation between patent and copyright protection, and more
importantly create a series of dilemmas for the Paris-Berne regime.
Treating computer programs as mere machine parts and requiring
the level of inventiveness historically demanded for patent protection, would leave most publicly distributed computer programs
completely unprotected. Treating computer programs as functional literary works, entitled only to "thin" copyright protection
against wholesale slavish copying of nonfunctional code, would
leave unprotected the most valuable aspect of computer programs,
namely the data structures that determine the functional behavior
of the program. 60 On the other hand, treating computer programs
as full-blown cultural products, entitled to the entire panoply of
protection against comprehensive nonliteral or fragmentary literal
copying, as well as unauthorized adaptation, public distribution,
performance or display, would transform copyright into a system

that "grotesquely provides patent-like protection on the softest possible conditions for the longest possible time."6 1 Such overprotection would stifle the very incremental innovation that copyright law
62
is designed to encourage.
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475, 480-85 (1995) [hereinafter Reichman, Charting the Col-

lapse] (questioning capability of inherited institutional frameworks to meet needs
of innovator in information age). For a discussion of the crisis in the Paris-Berne

regime, see infra note 66 and accompanying text.
59. Reichman, Charting the Collapse, supra note 58, at 480-85; see also Jerome
H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patentand Copyright Paradigms,94 COLUM. L.
REv. 2432, 2435-36 (1994) [hereinafter Reichman, Legal Hybrids] (questioning
whether objects of contemporary intellectual property still conform to classic mod-

els of bipolar patent and copyright protection).
60. Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 59, at 2486.
61. Id. Reichman notes the particular inappropriateness of stretching copy-

right law to create an exclusive adaptation right in computer programs and compi-

lations of data. He further notes that:
[B]y persuading courts to overextend the exclusive right to prepare derivative works, copyright owners can assert proprietary claims to any subsequent innovations that exploit recognizable aggregates of the original
data and instruction sets, even though the matter claimed to have been
infringed contains .

.

. no personal expression and fulfills purely func-

tional objectives.
Jerome H. Reichman, ElectronicInformation Tools-The Outer Edge of World Intellectual

Property Law, 17 U. DAYrON L. REv. 797, 815 (1992) [hereinafter Reichman, Electronic Information].

62. Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 59, at 2486.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss1/5

16

McManis: Taking Trips on the Information Superhighway: International Intel

19961

TRIPS

ON THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY

Meanwhile, outside the bipolar structure of the Paris-Berne regime are to be found a proliferating number of hybrid, or sui
grmeris, forms of intellectual property protection-such as that provided in the United States and elsewhere for semiconductor chip
designs, 63 and that just established in Europe for the noncopyrightable contents of electronic databases64-that deviate not only from
the classic patent and the copyright paradigms, but also from the
more attenuated forms of industrial property protection that have
historically been accorded to trademarks and trade secrets. 65 A recent series of studies examining the evolution of legal hybrids concludes that such ad hoc legislative schemes often simply install
66
chronic states or recurring cycles of under- and over-protection.
This same series of studies traces the roots of the two-fold crisis
in the Paris-Berne regime, not so much to a failure of the dominant
patent and copyright paradigms, as to a failure of a third, generally
neglected, intellectual property paradigm to be found in classic
trade secret law. 67 Historically, trade secret law has not created any
exclusive intellectual property rights as such in know-how, but
merely protects industrial and commercial privacy by prohibiting
others from acquiring know-how prematurely through such improper means as bribery, industrial espionage and breach, or inducing breach, of contracts of confidentiality. 68 The grant of trade
secret protection, however, normally has the effect of protecting a
company's natural lead time advantage. Would-be competitors
must either develop their own know-how independently, reverse en63. For a discusssion of semiconductor chip protection in the United States,
see Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1994). For
a discussion of semiconductor chip design protection, both in the United States
and internationally, see infra notes 76, 78 and accompanying text.
64. For a discussion of electronic database protection in Europe, see infra
notes 79, 194-213 and accompanying text.
65. The law of trademarks merely protects trademarks against the likelihood
of confusion or dilution but not against copying as such. The interest protected is
thus the commercial reputation of the trademark owner. Similarly, the law of
trade secrets merely protects commercial privacy. See generally 1J. THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

ch. 2, at 2-2 to 2-38 (3d

ed. 1992) (explaining basic principles of trademark protection); ROGER M. MRGRIM,

1

MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS,

§ 1.03, at 1-89 (1996) (explaining that any

nonpublic information affording demonstrable competitive advantage may be
properly considered trade secrets).
66. For a discussion of under- and overprotection, see Reichman, supra note
58, at 504-12. See also Pamela Samuelson et. al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308 (1994) (discussing
problems in protecting computer programs of various legal regimes).
67. Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 59, at 2444-45.
68. For a discussion of the law of trade secrets, see infra notes 177-80 and
accompanying text.
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gineer any publicly distributed products that might reveal the knowhow, or acquire the know-how by license or assignment from a third
party, thereby contributing in one way or another to the overall cost
69
of innovation.
Reverse engineering of publicly distributed products is permitted because it normally acts as a spur to innovation, encourages
innovators to rely on available patent or copyright protection, sets
limits on the amount of lead time that trade secret law will protect
and provides a means for second-comers to circumvent harsh or
abusive licensing practices. 70 When reverse engineering of publicly
distributed products becomes either too difficult or too easy, however, trade secret protection can generate negative effects. When
reverse engineering proves too difficult, trade secret protection becomes more attractive to the innovator than either patent or copyright protection, and thus tends to supplant both. 71 When reverse
engineering is too easy, the absence of effective lead-time protection tends to stifle any innovation that does not qualify for patent or
copyright protection. This in turn generates political pressure for
precisely the kind of ad hoc tinkering with the dominant patent
and copyright paradigms or cobbling together of hybrid variants of
them that is said to be contributing to the current crisis in the ParisBerne regime. 72
Both the absence of natural lead time protection and ad hoc
legislative responses to it are said to be far from new, having
spawned over a century of recurring cycles of under- and over-protection for various types of applied art and industrial design. 73 At
the end of the nineteenth century, the occasional lack of natural
lead-time protection was a problem only for the few design-dependent technologies that then existed but has become a far more general condition today. Indeed, a dominant characteristic of key
information-based technologies evolving at the end of the twentieth
century is said to be that they are all composed of "incremental
74
innovation bearing know-how on its face."
69. Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 59, at 2439, 2506-10.
70. Id. at 2520-25.
71. For various references to the tendency of overbroad trade secret protection for computer programs and digital information, see infra notes 179-84, 324
and accompanying text.
72. For a discussion of the shortcomings of existing protection for legal hybrids, see Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 59, at 2445.
73. Reichman, supra note 59, at 2464.
74. Id. at 2444.
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Fashioning hybrid forms of intellectual property protection for
such technologies may well be an appropriate legal response, but it
not only undermines the bipolar structure of the Paris-Berne regime, but could undermine the Paris-Berne principle of national
treatment. Because such hybrid forms of protection arguably fall
outside the obligation imposed by the Paris and Berne Conventions
to provide national treatment in the grant of copyright and industrial property protection, countries creating hybrid forms of protection will be tempted to condition the protection of foreign works
solely on the basis of "material reciprocity"-i.e., protecting works
originating in a foreign country only if, and to the extent that, the
75
foreign country protects works originating in the host country.
In the hands of countries with sufficient dominance in a particular technology or a sufficiently important market for the technology, inclusion of reciprocity provisions in domestic intellectual
property legislation can function as a potent tool for pressuring
other countries to adopt similar legislation. This is precisely what
the United States succeeded in doing when it enacted sui generis
protection for semiconductor chip designs and conditioned protection of foreign chip designs on the grant of equivalent protection
for U.S. originated semiconductor chips. 76 Now, the European
Union is apparently adopting the same strategy in an effort to de77
velop a new sui generis form of database protection.
The TRIPS agreement makes a number of specific substantive
attempts to "reglobalize" the fragmenting Paris-Berne regime. For
example, it codifies the minimum standards for the protection of
semiconductor chip designs that the United States effectively imposed on the industrialized world by means of the material reciprocity provision contained in its sui generis chip design statute. 78
However, the TRIPS agreement, particularly its provisions dealing
75. For a discussion of material reciprocity and the principle of national treatment, see Geller, supra note 48, at 100-01 and Reichman, UniversalMinimum Standards, supra note 7, at 347-51.
76. Charles R. McManis, InternationalProtectionfor Semiconductor Chip Designs
and the Standard ofJudicial Review of PresidentialProclamationsIssued Pursuant to the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 22 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 331,
331-32 (1988).
77. For a further discussion of a new sui generis form of database protection,
see infra notes 190-221 and accompanying text.
78. TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, art. 35-38. Article 35 obliges GATI'/WTO
member countries to comply with most, but not all provisions of the earlier, WIPOsponsored Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits. Id.

art. 35. In addition, Article 35 requires GATI'/WTO to comply with the provisions
contained in Articles 36-38 of TRIPS with respect to the scope of protection, acts
not requiring the authorization of the right holder and the term of protection. Id.
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with the protection of computer programs and compilations of
data, failed to address the underlying problem of the absence of
natural lead time protection for incremental innovation bearing
know-how on its face. Thus, it essentially institutionalizes, at an international level, the same "know-how gap" that is said to have long
plagued domestic intellectual property systems and brought about
the crisis in the Paris-Berne regime in the first place. 79 For that
reason, the TRIPS agreement is unlikely to halt the Balkanizing
pressures being exerted on international intellectual property law.
Indeed, the European Union's recent adoption of its Directive for
the Legal Protection of Databases, which creates a new sui generis
form of protection for the uncopyrightable contents of databases
and couples with it a requirement of material reciprocity for the
protection of works originating outside the European Union, suggests that the crisis in the Paris-Berne regime will continue.
A final criticism of the TRIPS agreement is that, by building on
the foundation of the two Great Conventions, it essentially looks to
the past, rather than to the future, thereby ignoring perhaps the
most fundamental threat of all to the Paris-Berne regime. Differences among intellectual property systems around the world have
been manageable up until now under the national treatment provisions of the Paris and Berne Conventions because domestic intellectual property systems have primarily regulated commerce in
physical objects or activities that had to be located in a particular
jurisdiction in order for a dispute over them to arise.8 0 Digital technology and global computer networks, on the other hand, are rapidly undermining the whole concept of territorially-limited
intellectual property rights. 81
B. Dispute Resolution Provisions
Given the uncertain scope of the substantive protection required for computer programs and databases under the TRIPS
agreement and the mounting crisis in the underlying Paris-Berne
79. For a general discussion of the "know-how gap," see Reichman, Know-How
Gap, supra note 50, at 786-94.
80. Geller, supra note 48, at 106-07; Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property
Rights and the Global Information Economy, 39 COMM. OF THE ACM 26, (Jan. 1996)
[hereinafter Intellectual Property] (discussing differences between nations' approaches to intellectual property rights and need for harmony among them).
81. SeeJane C. Ginsburg, Global Use/TerritorialRights: Private InternationalLaw
Questions of the Global Information Infrastructure,42 J. CoPRIGHT Soc'y U.SA. 318,
320 (1995) (observing that: "for works on the GII, there will be no physical territoriality; no way to stop works at the border, because there will be no borders. Without physical territoriality, can legal territoriality persist?").
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regime on which TRIPS is based, the most important contribution
of TRIPS may ultimately turn out to be the international dispute
resolution provisions contained in Part V of the agreement.
Whereas the earlier Paris and Berne Conventions (together with
the implementing legislation of individual member countries)
merely established a system of private international law, whose substantive provisions are enforced (if at all) by the domestic courts of
member countries in disputes between private parties, the TRIPS
agreement establishes both mandatory minimum civil and criminal
enforcement standards that are to be adhered to by individual
WTO member countries and a system of public international dispute settlement for any intellectual property disputes that arise be82
tween member countries of the WTO.
Article 64 of the TRIPS agreement specifies that the provisions
of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATI', as elaborated and applied by
the 1994 Understanding on Dispute Settlement (the "1994 Understanding") contained in the Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, are to apply to
consultations and the settlement of disputes under the TRIPS
agreement.8 3 The 1994 Understanding has been described by one
commentator as a triumph of lawyers over diplomats.84 It is said to
constitute a decisive step in the direction of a more legalistic, adjudicatory process advocated by the United States and away from the
flexible, diplomatic approach to dispute resolution long favored by
Japan and members of the European Union,8 5 and reflected in the
original GATT dispute resolution provisions contained in Articles
XXII and XXIII of the original 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs
86
and Trade.
Article XXII, for example, merely obliges GATT member countries to "afford adequate opportunity for consultation" and to "accord sympathetic consideration" regarding any matter affecting the
operation of the agreement. 87 Article XXIII, in turn, provides only
slightly more in the way of international enforcement teeth where
any member country believes that any benefit under GATT is being
82. Geller, supra note 48, at 104-14.
83. For a discussion of the 1994 Understanding on Dispute Settlement (the
"1994 Understanding"), see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
84. Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAW. 389, 389-91 (1995).
85. Id.; Davey, supra note 4, at 75.
86. For a further discussion of Articles XXII and XXIII, see supra note 25.
The text of the 1994 GATT agreement, including the 1994 Understanding, is reprinted in Part III of PESCATORE ET AL., supra note 4.
87. Art. XXII, GATT 1947, supra note 4, at GATT 41.
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"nullified or impaired" or that the attainment of any objective of
GATT is being impeded as a result of either (a) the failure of a
member country to carry out its obligations under GATT, (b) the
application by a member country of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with a provision of GATIT or (c) any other situation. a8 According to Article XXIII, a complaint of nullification or impairment can be made to the GATIT membership as a whole, which is to
investigate the matter and make appropriate recommendations and
rulings. If the nullification or impairment is serious enough, the
GATT membership may authorize the suspension of concessions.8 9
Although most complaints brought under Article XXIII have
alleged specific violations of GATT, 90 Article XXIII (b) permits complaints for nullification or impairment of benefits even where there
is no explicit violation of a relevant agreement. Article XXIII(b) is
likely to play a crucial role in the resolution of international intellectual property disputes. Nonviolation nullification or impairment
complaints could well become the vehicle for raising and resolving
international intellectual property controversies that the TRIPS
agreement itself does not explicitly address. 9 1
Article 2 of the 1994 Understanding states that the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"), established pursuant to the agreement creating the WTO, is to administer the rules and procedures of the
1994 Understanding and the consultation and dispute settlement
provisions of a covered agreement (such as TRIPS), except as
otherwise provided. 9 2 The DSB is to have authority to (1) establish
dispute resolution panels, (2) adopt the reports of these panels, as
well as reports of the Appellate Body that the DSB is to establish to
hear appeals from panel determinations, (3) maintain surveillance
of implementation of rulings and recommendations and (4) authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations under the
covered agreements.
88. Id. at GATT 42.
89. Only one complaint is said to have ever resulted in a threat of suspension
of concessions; the reason for this is that GATT panel decisions have invariably
been implemented, albeit with varying degrees of footdragging. Young, supra note
84, at 392; see generally Ted L. McDorman, Unilateralism (Section 301) to Multilateralism (GATT): Settlement of InternationalIntellectual Property Disputes After the Uruguay
Round, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY- THE SEARCH FOR A

BALANCED SYSTEM 119 (George R. Stewart et al. eds., 1994) (discussing move from
section 301 to GATT agreement in settlement of international intellecutual property disputes).
90. Davey, supra note 4, at 71.

91. For a further discussion of nullification or impairment, see infra text ac-

companying note 160.
92. 1994 Understanding, art. 2 in PESCATORE
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Although Article 3 of the 1994 Understanding specifies that
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements, it also states that the dispute settlement system of the WTO
is "to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international
law." 93 The reference to "customary rules of interpretation" is said
to be particularly important in the context of TRIPS dispute settlement.9 4 Because TRIPS is unique among the covered GATT/WTO
agreements in its incorporation of a variety of existing multilateral
conventions, which are themselves the subject of extensive national
and regional implementing legislation and judicial interpretation,
WTO dispute panels may find it necessary to refer to existing national and regional law and practice under the Paris-Berne regime
in order to interpret a number of provisions in the TRIPS agreement. If state practice has become "sufficiently widespread, and is
accompanied by the necessary opinio juris, that practice will ripen
into an independent customary rule of law that a tribunal, including a [WTO dispute] panel, must apply as a rule supplementary to
the treaty text, provided that it is not inconsistent with that text."95
Reference to customary state practice should be particularly helpful
to a WTO dispute panel confronting disputes growing out of the
96
interoperability debate.
Following twenty articles detailing the rules and procedures
that the DSB is to follow in exercising its authority at each stage of
the dispute resolution process, Article 23 of the 1994 Understanding specifies that when members seek the redress of a violation of
obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under
the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any
objective of the covered agreement, they are to have recourse to,
and abide by, the rules and procedures of the 1994 Understanding.
To make the meaning of this provision unmistakably clear, Article
23 goes on to state that members are not to make a determination
to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been
nullified or impaired, or that the attainment of any objective or the
covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to
dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of
93. Id. art. 3.
94. For a further discussion of disparity in interpretation, see Abbott, supra
note 16 (discussing phrase "customary rules of interpretation").
95. Abbott, supra note 16.
96. For a further discussion of customary state practice and its relevance to
the interoperability debate, see infra note 161 and accompanying text.
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the 1994 Understanding. Article 23 leaves "no doubt that freelance, unilateral, or even unauthorized bilateral dispute resolution
97
is not acceptable."
This is not to say that the 1994 Understanding altogether prohibits members from resolving disputes by means other than panel
decisions. The 1994 Understanding does contain various provisions designed to encourage consultations and resort to the voluntary procedures of good offices, conciliation and mediation. In
addition, Article 25 of the 1994 Understanding permits parties, by
mutual agreement, to submit to binding arbitration any issues that
are clearly defined by both parties. Article 25 requires that members be notified of all arbitration agreements and subjects any arbitration awards to the requirements of Articles 21 and 22. These two
articles, in turn, govern surveillance of recommendations and rulings of dispute panels and the award of compensation or suspension of concessions. The purpose of the Article 25 restrictions on
arbitration is to "limit the distortions of procedure and, more importantly, substance that might occur when countries of vastly different economic and political power are in disagreement." 98
Article 64 of TRIPS does contain one significant, if temporary,
limitation on the use of the WTO dispute resolution process. According to Article 64, complaints of nullification or impairment of
benefits not amounting to a violation of the TRIPS agreement are
not to be subject to the dispute settlement process for a period of
five years from the entry into force of the agreement establishing
the WTO. During the intervening five-year period, the TRIPS
Council, established pursuant to Article IV of the WTO Agreement,
is to examine and make recommendations to the WTO Ministerial
Conference regarding the "scope and modalities" for making
nonviolation complaints pursuant to the TRIPS agreement.
This five-year delay in nonviolation dispute settlement parallels
the five-year transition period that Article 65 provides for developing countries in implementing the TRIPS agreement. 99 Taken together, these two provisions seem to imply that while developing
countries may have five years to come into compliance with TRIPS,
industrialized countries such as the United States likewise have five
years in which to continue employing threats of trade sanctions in
bilateral trade negotiations in order to prevent what they consider
to be a nullification or impairment of benefits accruing under
97. Young, supra note 84, at 400.
98. Id. at 401.
99. For a discussion of Article 65, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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TRIPS. For its part, the United States has made it abundantly clear
that it intends to continue using such pressure tactics on vulnerable
developing countries in order to "accelerate" implementation of
the TRIPS agreement and to achieve even higher levels of intellectual property protection in those countries than are required by the
TRIPS agreement. 10 0
For the industrialized world, on the other hand, the time for
compliance with the TRIPS agreement, including utilization of its
dispute resolution provisions-at least with respect to any violation
complaints-has already arrived. Thus, any complaint that an industrialized country is failing to carry out its obligations under the
TRIPS agreement must currently be dealt with in accordance with
the GATT/WTO dispute settlement process.' 0 1 In the year 2000,
complaints of nonviolation nullification or impairment of benefits
accruing under the TRIPS agreement will likewise be subject to
GATT/WTO dispute settlement, whether brought against an industrialized or a developing country.
To illustrate how international controversies over intellectual
property rights for emerging computer technologies might (or
might not) be amenable to WTO dispute settlement, either now or
in the year 2000, it will be useful to examine how that dispute settlement process might be utilized in two relevant international debates involving emerging computer technologies-namely, the
current international debate over the interoperability of computer
100. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3581 (1994). The Uruguay Round Agreements Act states, inter alia, that:
It is the objective of the United States(1) to accelerate the implementation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights referred to in section 3511
(d)(15) of this title, (2) to seek enactment and effective implementation
by foreign countries of laws to protect and enforce intellectual property
rights that supplement and strengthen the standards of the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ...and, in particular(A) to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements that create
obligations to protect and enforce intellectual property rights that
cover new and emerging technologies and new methods of transmission and distribution.
Id. For a discussion of a possible conflict between this U.S. objective and various
U.S. obligations under the TRIPS agreement and GATr, see infra notes 306-08 and
accompanying text.
101. In fact, the WTO dispute settlement process has already been invoked.
The United States and the European Union recently brought complaints against
Japan to bring its copyright law into compliance with TRIPS by amending it to
protect sound recordings made as far back as 1946. Bhushan Bahree, U.S., European Union Turn to WITO to MakeJapanExtend Music Protection, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12,
1996, at A10.
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programs and the emerging international debate over intellectual
property protection on the global information superhighway.
III.

THE INTEROPERABILITY DEBATE

Prior to being engulfed in the larger debate over global computer networks and digital technology, the most hotly contested intellectual property issue in the industrialized world concerned
computer program interoperability. The interoperability debate remains crucial to any discussion of the information superhighway,
because the whole concept of an information superhighway presupposes the interoperability of software as well as hardware. Indeed,
one of the stated goals in the Clinton administration's agenda for
developing a National Information Infrastructure (NII) was to
"[p]romote seamless, interactive, user-driven operation of the
NII." 10 2

The administration recognized that to achieve its goal, in-

teroperability of computer programs, systems and networks is a necessity. In its White Paper on Intellectual Property and the NII, the
administration stated that " [i] nteroperability and interconnectivity
of networks, systems, services and products operating within the NII
will enhance its development and success."103
At the core of the interoperability debate are the intellectual
property rights of various highway "builders." Specifically, the debate has been concerned with how to balance the intellectual property rights of the "prime contractors" (i.e., computer industry
leaders who set de facto hardware and software standards for the
industry) against the needs of various "subcontractors" (i.e., second-comers) who seek to create subsidiary parts of the system.
In both domestic and international forums, various U.S. officials in the Executive Branch have taken positions strongly favoring
the intellectual property rights of the "prime contractors" over the
need of "subcontractors" to achieve interoperability. 10 4 On the
other hand, court decisions in the United States, as well as the EC
Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 10 5 take a
more balanced approach to the question.
The interoperability debate has focused on two specific issues-namely, whether, and to what extent, copyright law (or for
102. The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, Administration Policy Statement, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025 (1993).
103. WirrE PAPER, supra note 10, at 199.
104. For a discussion of the United States' position on intellectual property
right of prime contractors over subcontractors, see infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
105. EC Directive, supra note 8.
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that matter any other form of intellectual property protection) that
might be available for computer software technology (1) protects a

program's interface specifications or other functional elements
and/or (2) precludes reverse engineering which may be necessary
to achieve interoperability among computer programs. Court decisions in the United States have provided a more comprehensive dis-

cussion of the first question, while the EC Directive has fashioned a
more detailed rule with respect to the second. 10 6
A.

Protection of Interface Specifications

Courts in the United States have only recently dealt in any coherent fashion with the appropriate scope of copyright protection

for computer programs, or the more specific questions like the protectibility of interface specifications and the legality of reverse engineering of computer programs. The courts first had to determine

whether computer programs in machine-readable (or object-code)
form, as well as those written in human-readable (or source-code)
form, constituted copyrightable subject matter under section 102 of
the Copyright Act.107
During the course of what has come to be called the first generation of computer program copyright cases, commentators ar106. For two highly readable, albeit highly partisan, accounts of the interoperability debate, see

JONATHAN BAND & MASANOBU KATOH, INTERFACES ON TRIAL: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTEROPERABILrrY IN THE GLOBAL SOFTWARE INDUSTRY

(1995) (generally opposing copyright protection for interface specifications and
favoring reverse engineering) and ANTHONY L. CLAPES, SorrwARs: THE LEGAL BATTLES FOR CONTROL OF THE GLOBAL SoFrwARE INDUSTRY

(1993) (generally favoring

copyright protection for interface specifications and opposing reverse engineering). See also Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property Protection and Reverse Engineering of Computer Programs in the United States and European Community, 8 HIGH TECH.
L.J. 25 (1993) (concluding that reverse engineering of computer programs where
necessary to gain access to unprotected ideas is fair use under U.S. copyright law
and that contracts-or at least shrink-wrap licenses-prohibiting reverse engineering are probably preempted by federal copyright and patent law). For a more
recent comparison of U.S. and EC law, see Pamela Samuelson, Comparing U.S. and
EC CopyrightProtectionfor Computer Programs: Are They More Different Than They Seem ,
13J.L. & COM. 279 (1994) [hereinafter Samuelson, Comparing U.S. andEC Copyright
Protection].
107. 17-U.S.C. § 102 (1994). Section 102(a) states that: "Copyright protection subsists.., in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device." Id. § 102(a). The precise legal question raised by machine-readable
computer programs is whether it is sufficient under section 102(a) that a program
can be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated" in the sense that its
operation of a machine or device can be perceived, or the program can be reproduced by, or communicated to a machine or device, or whether it is necessary for
the program to be perceived or reproduced by, or communicated to, a human
being.
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gued for and against granting copyright protection to publicly
distributed machine-readable versions of a computer program. 0 8
Some of those opposed argued that to provide such protection
without requiring publication of the source-code (which software
developers generally protect as a closely guarded trade secret),
would subvert what is said to be one of the traditional, constitutionally-based norms of federal copyright law-namely "that bringing
new ideas into the public domain was the quid pro quo the public
received in exchange for the limited monopoly right the author received to protect his or her expression of the ideas."' 0 9 Computer
programs were said to pose two unique problems for copyright law.
Before the advent of computer programs, publicly distributed copyrighted works necessarily communicated the ideas the works contained. In the case of computer programs, however, "it is possible
both to publish a work and keep it secret, and keeping it secret is
part of the way the commercial value of the work is maintained." 1 0
A further problem was said to be that the object-code version
of a computer program functions in a far more utilitarian way than
virtually any previous work of authorship. Unlike a factual work, a
108. CompareAnthony L. Clapes et al., Silicon Epics and Binaiy Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programs, 34 UCLA L. REv.
1493 (1987) (describing two generations of copyright cases and opposing views of
commentators over both generations and coming down on side of those favoring
broad copyright protection for computer programs) with Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protectionfor Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1045
(1989) (discussing two generations of cases and opposing broad protection); and
Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software, and the New Protectionism, 28
JUPRMETRJCSJ. 33 (1987) (discussing two generations of cases and opposing broad
copyright protection for computer programs). See generally McManis, supra note
106, at 41-44 (discussing two generations of cases).
109. Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection
for ComputerProgramsin Machine-ReadableForm, 1984 DusK L.J. 663, 705-06 [hereinafter Samuelson, Case Against Copyright Protection]. The Final Report of the Committee on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU)
recommended that the 1976 Copyright Act (the "1976 Act") be amended to expressly grant copyright protection for computer programs. The amendments proposed by CONTU were enacted in Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3007 (1980),
codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1995).
The constitutionally-based norm invoked by Samuelson was reaffirmed and
reiterated in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991). In that case, holding that the alphabetical listings in the white pages of a
telephone directory did not constitute an original work of authorship, the
Supreme Court noted that:
The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors,
but "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." To this end,
copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed
by a work.
Id. at 349-50 (citations omitted).
110. Samuelson, supra note 109, at 710.
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book of instructions or even a human-readable source-code version
of a computer program, the object-code version of a program does
not instruct a human being at all about how a task might be performed. Rather, in conjunction with computer hardware, it performs the task itself."' The economic value of a machine-readable
version of a computer program comes, not from the information it
conveys to human beings, but rather from the information it conveys to a machine. Historically, the only intellectual property protection available for publicly distributed utilitarian works of this sort
2
has been patent protection."
For the foregoing reasons, these commentators argued in favor
of creating a separate, sui generis form of protection for machinereadable versions of computer programs." 3 In a similar vein, the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), an international
1 14
agency created to administer the Paris and Berne Conventions,
developed a model sui generis law for the protection of computer
programs. A number of countries, including France and Korea, actually enacted sui generis computer program legislation. 1' 5
The first generation of computer copyright decisions in the
United States, however, ultimately rejected the argument that copyright law should not protect computer programs that convey information to a machine rather than to a human being and extended
copyright protection to computer programs in all forms." 6 That
same approach was taken in the EC Directive on Computer Programs" 7 and eventually in Article 10 of TRIPS as well." 8
In a second generation of software copyright cases, the courts
in the United States have been more divided over the appropriate
scope of copyright protection for computer programs. The specific
question raised in this second generation of cases has been whether
and how far copyright protection should extend beyond the literal
111. Id. at 727.
112. Id. at 735.
113. Id. at 762-69.
114. For a further discussion of the WIPO, see supra note 29.
115. For a discussion of the WIPO model law and the sui generis legislation
enacted in France, see Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 59, at 2481-83. For a
discussion of the Korean legislation, see Byoung Kock Min & Gary Sullivan, Recognition of ProprietaryInterests in Software in Korea: Programmingfor Comprehensive Reform, 8 MICH. Y.B. OF INT'L LEcAL STUD. 49 (1987) (discussing intellectual property
rights in Korea).
116. See generally McManis, supra note 106, at 41-44 (citing cases therein).
117. For a discussion of the EC Directive's approach to protection of computer programs in all forms, see infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
118. For a discussion of TRIPS's approach to protection of computer programs in all forms, see infra note 121 and accompanying text.
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code of a computer program to the structure, sequence and organization, or to other nonliteral or functional elements of the
program.1 1 9
Historically, copyright protection has extended only to a
work's expression and not to the ideas being expressed. 120 That
principle is codified in Article 9 of TRIPS, which states that copyright is to extend to expressions and not to ideas, procedures,
1 21
methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.
Although U.S. copyright protection has been held to extend beyond a work's literal expression to reasonably detailed patterns contained in the work, the cases first enunciating this expansive
prohibition against nonliteral copying were concerned with the
scope of protection for more traditional literary and artistic works,
as opposed to factual or functional works. 122 It is equally well established in U.S. copyright decisions that where a work's ideas can only
be expressed in a limited number of ways, the ideas and expression
contained in the work are to be treated as having merged and thus
wholly unprotectible. 123 Even where copyright protection for a factual or functional work is not altogether withheld, the courts have
made it clear that the scope of copyright protection for factual and
124
functional works is to be "thin."
119. Compare Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,
1236 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that "the purpose or function of a utilitarian work
would be the work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or
function would be part of the expression of the idea"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031
(1987), with Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705-12 (rejecting
Whelan's general formulation that program's overall purpose equates with program's idea as descriptively inadequate and adopting three step, "abstraction-filtration-comparison" test for deciding cases that deal with nonliteral copying).
The secondary literature on this issue is voluminous. See generally 3 MELVILLE
B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPRIuGHT § 13.03(F), at 13-114 to 13-148 (1995) (explaining filtering method used to determine similarity between computer programs);
McManis, supra note 106, at 43, n.73, (citing five articles relied on in Altai case).
120. McManis, supra note 106, at 36.
121. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 9.
122. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930)
(holding that ideas are not protected by copyright laws, but that reasonably detailed patterns contained in work can be protected as expression), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931). See generally McManis, supranote 106, at 43-44 (explaining difference between protected expression and unprotected ideas).
123. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st
Cir. 1967) (holding subject matter uncopyrightable when there are limited
number of ways of expressing idea conveyed); see generally McManis, supra note
106, at 40-41 (discussing idea/expression dichotomy).
124. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991); see
generally McManis, supra note 106, at 69 (distinguishing factual works from creative

works).
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In a seminal copyright infringement case alleging nonliteral
copying of a computer program, Computer Associates International,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 12 5 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recognized that a computer's ultimate function or purpose is the
composite result of interacting subroutines, each of which may be
said to have its own (unprotectible) idea. The court also noted the
earlier suggestion by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,Inc.,12 6 that the only
unprotectible idea contained in a computer program is the overall
idea or function of the program as a whole, is simply descriptively
inadequate. In order to distinguish copyrightable expression from
the unprotectible ideas, when a claimed infringement is the result
of nonliteral copying of a computer program, the Altai court formulated a sophisticated three-part test, which has come to be called
the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, for determining whether
two programs contain substantially similar expression.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Altai opinion for the
interoperability debate is its discussion of the second-filtration-step
in this test. Filtration, the court said, involves the examination of
the structural components at each level of abstraction to discover
whether "their inclusion at that level was 'idea' or was dictated by
considerations of efficiency, so as to be necessarily incidental to that
idea; required by factors external to the program itself; or taken
from the public domain, and hence is nonprotectible expression." 12 7 The court went on to hold that copyright protection
should not extend to those program elements where:
[A] programmer's freedom of design choice is often circumscribed by extrinsic considerations such as (1) the
mechanical specifications of the computer on which a particular program is intended to run; (2) compatibility requirements of other programs with which a program is
designed to operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufacturers' design standards; (4) demands of the industry
being serviced; and (5) widely accepted programming
12 8
practices within the computer industry.
In effect, the Altai court seems to have held (or at least to have
suggested) that copyright protection simply does not extend to in125.
126.
127.
128.

982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
979 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
Atai, 982 F.2d at 706.
Id. at 709-10.
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terface specifications or other program elements dictated by interoperability requirements.
In a more recent case, Lotus Development Corp. v. BorlandInternational, Inc.,12 9 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explicitly
ruled that a computer menu command hierarchy is an uncopyrightable "method of operation" within the meaning of section 102(b)
of the Copyright Act, and thus cannot be protected even against
literal copying. In so holding, the court noted that:
The fact that there may be many different ways to operate
a computer program, or even many different ways to operate a computer program using a set of hierarchically arranged command terms, does not make the actual
method of operation chosen copyrightable; it still functions as a method for operating the computer and as such
is uncopyrightable. 3 0
Consequently, "[o] riginal developers are not the only people entitled to build on the methods of operation they create; anyone
can."

131

If Altai and Lotus, rather than Whelan, turn out to be the culmination of the second generation of computer program copyright
cases in the United States, as courts and commentators are increasingly asserting,1 2 these two cases will have firmly re-established the
line of demarcation between copyright and industrial property protection for computer programs, by reaffirming that copyright protection extends only to a program's nonfunctional expression. To
protect functional aspects of a program, one must resort to federal
patent or state trade secret protection.
The EC Directive on Legal Protection for Computer Programs
(the "EC Directive") is not as explicit about the absence of copyright protection for interface specifications and other functional elements of computer programs as Altai and Lotus are. Article 1(2)
does state, however, that "[i] deas and principles which underlie any
element of a computer program, including those which underlie its
interfaces, are not protected by copyright under this Directive."' 3 3
While this language does not state unequivocally that interface
129. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 4059 (1996) (by
equally divided Court).

130. Id. at 818.
131. Id.
132. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?,
10 HIGH TECH L. Rv. 1 (1995) (discussing development of software protection).
133. EC Directive, supra note 8, art. 1(2).
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specifications are unprotectible, the legislative history of the article,
as well as the later language in Article 6, explicitly permitting reverse engineering "to obtain the information necessary to achieve
the interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs," 13 4 both strongly suggest that Article
1(2) should be interpreted in a manner compatible with the Altai
1 35
and Lotus decisions.
B.

Reverse Engineeringof Computer Programs

In the same year that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit decided the Altai case, two other U.S. courts of appeals addressed the legality of reverse engineering another's computer program. In Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc.13 6 and Sega
EnterprisesLtd. v. Accolade, Inc.,137 the Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Ninth Circuit concluded that, at least where the
computer program involved is designed to prevent unauthorized
electronic game cartridges from operating on a game console, reverse engineering of a publicly distributed copy of the program by
means of decompilation or disassembly, 138 can constitute a fair use
under section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.13 9 The court in
134. Id., art. 6. For the text of Article 6 of the EC Directive, see infra note 149
and accompanying text.
135. BAND & KATOH, supra note 106, at 242-44.
136. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
137. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). For a detailed discussion of the Atari and
Sega cases, see Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineeringand the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism:
Intellectual PropertyImplicationsof "Lock-Out"Programs,68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1091 (1995)
and McManis, supra note 106, at 45-48.
138. For a detailed discussion of the various ways to reverse engineer a computer program and the distinction between decompilation, or disassembly, and
other forms of reverse engineering, see McManis, supra note 106, at 28-31. In
brief, decompilation requires actual translation of object-code into human-readable source-code, while other means of reverse engineering do not. Id.
139. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). The full text of § 107 is as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in
any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
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Sega, went on to state explicitly that a party in rightful possession of
a computer program may undertake necessary efforts, including
disassembly or decompilation, to gain an understanding of the unprotected functional elements of the program, at least where there
is a legitimate reason for doing so and no other means of access to
the unprotected elements exist.14°
The one previous U.S. appellate ruling on the legality of reverse engineering was a poorly reasoned court of appeals decision
in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd.,14 1 which may have erred as
much in the direction of underprotecting computer programs as
the Whelan court had erred in overprotecting them. 142 Specifically,
the court held that reverse engineering that could be accomplished
merely by loading the program into a computer and analyzing its
functions, without resort to decompilation or disassembly, was permissible under section 117 of the Copyright Act of 1976. The Vault
court held this even though (contrary to the express language of
section 117) the reverse engineer in this case was merely a lawful
possessor, and not the "owner" of the particular copy of the program reverse engineered 143 and even though the explicit purpose
of the reverse engineering was to defeat a copy-protection (rather
than a lock-out) device. 144 Reaching a more defensible result (albeit by way of equally indefensible reasoning), the Vault court held
that any "shrink-wrap" contractual restriction on the ownership or
reverse engineering of a computer program, as well as a state law
purporting to uphold such restrictions, was preempted by federal
14 5
copyright law.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use
if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
Id.

87.

140. Sega Enterprises, 977 F.2d at 1518.
141. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
142. For a critique of the Vault decision, see McManis, supra note 106, at 81-

143. McManis, supra note 106, at 83-84.
144. Id. at 86.
145. Id. at 88-99. For the reasons the court should have given for preempting
shrink-wrap licenses and state shrink-wrap license legislation, see id. at 88-96. But cf.
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding (1) that
shrink-wrap license accompanying mass-distributed CD-ROM containing computer
program and associated database is enforceable contract, even though notice on
packaging merely declares that software comes with restrictions contained inside
box; and (2) that federal copyright law does not preempt enforcement of provision in license, which is encoded on CD-ROM and appears on user's computer
screen every time software runs, as well as being printed in accompanying manual,
prohibiting purchaser from making any commercial use of CD-ROM). In dictum,
the ProCD court implied that shrink-wrap license provisions prohibiting disassembly of computer programs would also be enforceable. Id.
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Collectively, the decisions in Atari, Sega and Vault, permitting
various forms of reverse engineering, appear to have brought U.S.
copyright law into harmony with two separate reverse engineering
provisions contained in the EC Directive. 1 6 The contractual preemption holding in the Vault decision, on the other hand, does not
yet appear to represent ajudicial consensus on that point, and may
or may not be equivalent to a third provision in the EC Directive
declaring that any contractual restriction contrary to the reverse en1 47
gineering provisions of the EC Directive are null and void.
Article 5(3) of the EC Directive specifies that:
The person having a right to use a copy of a computer
program shall be entitled, without the authorization of the
[copy]rightholder, to observe, study or test the functioning of the program in order to determine the ideas and
principles which underlie any element of the program if
he does so while performing any of the acts of loading,
displaying, running, transmitting or storing the program
1 48
which he is entitled to do.
146. For the full text and a discussion of the two reverse engineering provisions contained in the EC Directive, see infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of areas of potential disharmony between U.S. copyright law and
the EC Directive, see Samuelson, Comparing U.S. and EC Copyright Protection,supra
note 106, at 279. Among the sources of potential disharmony are said to be (1)
the rules regulating license contract terms restricting reverse engineering and (2)
the rules governing reverse engineering for purposes other than achieving interoperability-for example, reverse engineering to obtain access to an unpatented
algorithm. For a discussion of both points, see infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text. While the potential for conflict over the validity of contracts purporting
to restrict reverse engineering is real, the likelihood of conflict over reverse engineering to discover unpatented algorithms is more remote-if only because the
reverse engineering and any subsequent use of the algorithm discovered will undoubtedly be shrouded in secrecy and will thus be discoverable only through similar acts of reverse engineering for purposes other than to achieve interoperability.
For a further discussion of reverse engineering to discover unpatented algorithms,
see infra text following note 151.
147. For a recent appellate court decision taking a different view on the validity of shrink-wrap licenses, see supra note 145 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the provision in the EC Directive declaring that any contractual restrictions
contrary to the reverse engineering provisions of the EC Directive are null and
void, see infra note 181 and accompanying text.
148. EC Directive, supra note 8, art. 5(3). Article 5 must be read in conjunction with Article 4, which enumerates the "restricted acts" of the right holder, to
which Articles 5 and 6 state exceptions. The text of Article 4 is as follows:
Restricted Acts
Subject to the provisions of Articles 5 and 6, the exclusive rights of the
rightholder within the meaning of Article 2, shall include the right to do
or to authorize:
(a) the permanent or temporary reproduction of a computer program by any means and in any form, in part or in whole. Insofar as
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This provision, by allowing the reverse analysis of a computer program while using it in conjunction with a computer, appears to create a right equivalent to the one recognized in Vault as emanating
from section 117 of the 1976 Copyright Act.
In addition, the EC Directive contains a separate provision specifically addressing decompilation and disassembly. Article 6 of the
Directive states that:
The authorization of the [copy]rightholder shall not be
required where reproduction of the code and translation
of its form... are indispensable to obtain the information
necessary to achieve the interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs,
provided that the following conditions have been met:
loading, displaying, running, transmission or storage of the computer program necessitate such reproduction, such acts shall be subject to authorization by the rightholder;
(b) the translation, adaptation, arrangement and any other alteration of a computer program and the reproduction of the results
thereof, without prejudice to the rights of the person who alters the
program;
(c) any form of distribution to the public, including the rental, of
the original computer program or of copies thereof. The first sale in
the Community of a copy of a program by the rightholder or with his
consent shall exhaust the distribution right within the Community of
that copy, with the exception of the right to control further rental of
the program or a copy thereof.
Id. art. .4.
The full text of Article 5 is as follows:
Exceptions to the restricted acts
1. In the absence of specific contractual provisions, the acts referred to in Article 4(a) and (b) shall not require authorization by
the rightholder where they are necessary for the use of the computer
program by the lawful acquirer in accordance with its intendedpurpose, including for error correction.
2. The making of a back-up copy by a person having a right to use
the computer program may not be prevented by contract insofar as it
is necessary for that use.
3. The person having a right to use a copy of a computer program
shall be entitled, without the authorization of the rightholder, to observe, study or test the functioning of the program in order to determine the ideas and principles which underlie any element of the
program if he does so while performing any of the acts of loading,
displaying, running, transmitting or storing the program which he is
entitled to do.
Id. art. 5.
For the full text of the entire EC Directive, see Thomas Dreier, The Council
Directive of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs,9 EuR. INTELL.
PROP. REp. 319, 327-40 (1991). For a discussion of the EC Directive, see Dreier,
supra,at 329 and Thomas C. Vinje, The Development of InteroperableProducts Under the
EC Software Directive, 8 COMPUTER LAw., 1, 3 (Nov. 1991).
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(a) these acts are performed by the licensee or by another

person having a right to use a copy of a program, or on
their behalf by a person authorized to do so;
(b) the information necessary to achieve interoperability
has not previously been readily available to the persons referred to in subparagraph (a);
(c) these acts are confined to the parts of the original program which are necessary to achieve interoperability. 14 9
Article 6 thus creates a right to decompile or disassemble a computer program where it is necessary to achieve interoperability with
another program. This provision appears to create a right
equivalent to the one recognized in Atari and Sega as emanating
from section 107's fair use privilege to reverse engineer a computer
program in order to defeat a lock-out device.
149. EC Directive, supranote 8, art. 6. Article 6 must be read in conjunction
with Article 4, which enumerates the "restricted acts" (i.e., the exclusive rights) of
the copyrightholder of a computer program. For the text of Article 4, see supra
note 148. The full text of Article 6 is as follows:
Decompilation
1. The authorization of the rightholder shall not be required where
reproduction of the code and translation of its form within the
meaning of Article 4(a) and (b) are indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs, provided
that the following conditions are met:
(a) these acts are performed by the licensee or by another person having a right to use a copy of a program, or on their behalf
by a person authorized to do so;
(b) the information necessary to achieve interoperability has not
previously been readily available to the persons referred to in
subparagraph (a); and
(c) these acts are confined to the parts of the original program
which are necessary to achieve interoperability.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not permit the information
obtained through its application:
(a) to be used for goals other than to achieve the interoperability of the independently created computer program;
(b) to be given to others, except when necessary for the interoperability of the independently created computer program; or
(c) to be used for the development, production or marketing of
a computer program substantially similar in its expression, or for
any other act which infringes copyright.
3. In accordance with the provisions of the Berne Convention for
the protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the provisions of this
Article may not be interpreted in such a way as to allow its application to be used in a manner which unreasonably prejudices the rightholder's legitimate interests or conflicts with a normal exploitation
of the computer program.
EC Directive, supra note 8, art. 6.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996

37

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 5

244

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41: p. 207

Finally, Article 9(1) of the EC Directive declares that any contractual provisions contrary to Article 5(3) and Article 6 are null
and void. 150 This provision formulates a rule that would encompass, but is nevertheless far broader than the Vault holding that
"shrink-wrap" contracts attempting to restrict reverse engineering
are preempted by U.S. copyright law.' 5 1
On the other hand, the fair use privilege recognized in Atari
and Sega to disassemble or decompile another's copyrighted computer program whenever necessary to get access to unprotected
ideas may be broader (at least in theory) than Article 6 of the EC
Directive, which merely permits decompilation or disassembly
where indispensable to achieve the interoperability of an independently created program with other programs. The actual likelihood
of such a conflict, however, is remote. Any reverse engineering for
purposes other than achieving interoperability, for example, reverse engineering to gain access to an unpatented algorithm which
is subsequently used in another program, is likely to be shrouded in
secrecy and only discoverable by means of similar reverse engineering for a purpose other than achieving interoperability.
Various U.S. government officials claim that Atari and Sega
should actually be read much more narrowly than the EC Directive.
Even though both Atari and Sega had involved unsuccessful claims
by Japanese companies that U.S. companies had illegally reverse engineered lock-out devices on the two leading brands of home entertainment game consoles, the United States Trade Representative
and the Secretary of Commerce did not hesitate to lodge a strong
protest with the Japanese Minister of International Trade and Industry, upon learning that the Japanese Agency for Cultural Affairs
had organized a Consultative Committee on Copyright Issues Relating to Computer Programs ("Consultative Committee"), to study,
among other issues, whether Japan's copyright law should be
15 2
amended to permit reverse engineering of computer programs.
The USTR expressed grave concern over the "clear implication that

150. EC Directive, supra note 8, art. 9(1).
151. For a discussion of the potential for conflict between the United States
and the European Union on this point, see infra notes 181-84 and accompanying
text.
152. Letter of Ronald H. Brown, Secretary of Commerce, and Michael Kantor, United States Trade Representative, to the Honorable Hiroshi Kumagai, Minister of International Trade and Industry, dated November 2, 1993. See generally
BAND & KATOH, supra note 106, at 299-303 (discussing United States's reaction to
Japan's actions).
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the purpose of the study is to determine ways to weaken Japan's
153
protection of computer programs under its copyright law."
In a subsequent statement submitted to the Consultative Committee, a representative of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) insisted that the Atari and Sega decisions must be
viewed as exceptional cases. Even though the courts in Atari and
Sega had explicitly stated their holdings in broad fair use terms,
while dismissing the assertions of Atari and Accolade that Nintendo
and Sega had engaged in copyright misuse, the USPTO nevertheless took the position that the cases should be interpreted as having
merely held that reverse engineering of a computer program is a
fair use when the copyright owner is engaging in an anticompetitive
misuse of the copyrighted work.15 4 Earlier, the USTR, acting under
"Special 301" had listed not only Japan, but also Australia, on a "priority watch" list, primarily out of concern that both countries were
considering copyright amendments permitting reverse engineering
155
of computer software.
Given the position of the USTR and the USPTO, it seems entirely possible that, notwithstanding the Atari and Sega cases and the
EC Directive, the legality of reverse engineering to achieve interoperability or for other purposes could become a subject for resolution by a WTO dispute settlement panel. The United States, for
example, could conceivably complain that any proposed copyright
amendment, such as the one that Japan was considering in 1993,
would violate Article 13 of TRIPS, which obliges members to "confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special
cases which do not conflict with the normal exploitation of the
work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the right holder."156 Although Article 13 does not itself answer the
question whether the enactment of a broad reverse engineering
privilege would or would not conflict with the normal exploitation
of a computer program or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
153. For a further discussion of the USTR's concerns regarding Japan's copyright protection of computer programs, see Letter of November 2, 1993, supra
note 152.
154. Statement of Christopher A. Meyer, Senior Copyright Attorney, Office of
Legislative & International Affairs, USPTO, before the Consultative Committee on
Copyright Issues Relating to Computer Programs, Tokyo, Dec. 13, 1993.
155. See CoMMoVwEALTH OF AUSTRALIA COYRIGHT LAw REVIEW COMMITTEE,
COMPUTER SoF-rwAR PROTECTION 30-31 (1995) (debating two approaches to copyright protection for computer programs). See generally BAND & KATOH, supra note
106, at 275-316 (discussing reverse engineering in Australia, Japan and United
States). For a discussion of "Special 301," see supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
156. TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, art. 13.
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rights of the copyright owner, the article clearly seems to provide a
sufficient legal basis for making such a claim, and thus invoking the
15 7
WTO dispute settlement process to decide the question.
Even if the United States did not file such a complaint, but
merely chose to threaten the use of "Special 301" procedures to
pressure a country such as Japan not to amend its domestic copyright law to include an explicit privilege to reverse engineer computer programs,1 5 8 Japan could conceivably lodge a complaint with
the WTO, claiming that such pressure tactics on the part of the
United States violate its current obligation under Article 23 of the
1994 Understanding and Article 64 of TRIPS to utilize the WTO
dispute settlement process in any intellectual property disputes involving alleged TRIPS violations.1 59 As a part of that complaint, Japan could insist that the underlying reverse engineering question
be submitted to a dispute panel for resolution. The United States
would then be in the uncomfortable position of having to concede
either that permitting reverse engineering is not an actual violation
of Article 13, or that the dispute is one that must be submitted to a
WTO dispute panel for resolution. After the year 2000, even a
claim that permitting reverse engineering amounts to a nullification or impairment of benefits accruing under TRIPS would be sub1 60
ject to WTO dispute resolution.
Were such a dispute panel convened, it would undoubtedly be
asked to determine whether the Atari and Sega decisions in the
United States and Article 6 of the EC Directive in fact enunciate
equivalent rules with respect to reverse engineering, and if so,
whether they comprise sufficient evidence of a widespread state
practice to be used as a customary source of international law in
interpreting Article 23 of TRIPS.1 6 ' Such a panel would be highly
unlikely to embrace the USPTO's narrow reading of the Atari and
Sega decisions, particularly given that the actual holdings enunciated in these two cases, together with the rule stated in Article 6 of
the EC Directive, seem far more consistent with the needs of developing countries as collective "second-comers" in the field of com157. For a discussion of the procedure for bringing a complaint of a GATT/

WTO violation or a nonviolation nullification or impairment of benefits, see supra
notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
158. For a discussion of "Special 301," see supra note 20 and accompanying

text.

159. For a discussion of Article 23, see supra note 97 and accompanying text.

160. For a further discussion of GATT/WTO dispute resolution, see supratext
following note 101.
161. For a further discussion of the reference in TRIPS to customary state
practice, see supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
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puter technology, than is the U.S. Government's idiosyncratic
reading of its own domestic case law.
The United States might fare better in the WTO dispute process were another country to refuse to grant any form of patent
protection for software technology.1 62 The United States could
plausibly argue that such a flat ban violates Article 27 of TRIPS,
which states that "patents shall be available for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of in63
dustrial application."'
The phrase "capable of industrial application," of course, creates an element of uncertainty as to the applicability of Article 27 to
"pure software" patents.' 64 This uncertainty is only deepened by an
accompanying footnote in the TRIPS agreement stating that the
phrase "'capable of industrial application,' may be deemed by a
Member [which also seems to suggest that it need not be deemed
162. In theory, at least, patent protection for software technology would simultaneously eliminate the need and the right to reverse engineer patented
software. The disclosure of the invention required for the patent to be valid would
presumably disclose sufficient information to ensure that a person of ordinary skill
in the art could practice the invention without undue experimentation and routinely write a program embodying the "best mode" of the invention. McManis,
supra note 106, at 98 and authorities cited therein. In the absence of express or
implied permission, any residual reverse engineering that might be necessary to
practice the invention or routinely write a program embodying the invention
would presumably constitute an infringing use under U.S. patent law, unless it
happened to fall within the narrow limits of "experimental use." Id. at 37 n.51.
Other countries, however, may define the experimental use exception more
broadly, as long as the exception does not violate Article 30 of TRIPS, which states
that:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account
of the legitimate interests of third parties.
TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, art. 27.
163. TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, at art. 27.
164. For a discussion of "pure software" patents, see McManis, supra note 106,
at 35, 97 and authorities cited therein. One of these authorities defines pure
software patents as "patents which specifically disclose and claim software technology without referring to hardware, other than a computer and typical peripheral
devices." Id. at 97 (citing Proprietary Rights Committee, Computer Law Section,
State Bar of Michigan, Survey of United States Software Patents Issued From July, 1987
Through December 1987, reprinted in 1 DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAw App. 3A-102
(1996)). The problem with pure software patents is that any patent granted on a
software invention entirely detached from any physical embodiment runs the risk
of extending patent protection to an abstract idea, or "law of nature," a class of
subject matter traditionally excluded from patent protection. For statements of
continuing concern over the danger posed by pure software patents, see infra note
316 and accompanying text.
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by a member] to be synonymous with the term... 'useful."' 165 A
GAT'/WTO member country could plausibly argue that it is entirely consistent with Article 27 of TRIPS to limit computer program patents to those software inventions that have a direct
1 66
industrial application.
On the other hand, the United States might argue that Article
1 of the Paris Convention, which is incorporated by reference in
Article 2 of TRIPS,167 specifies that industrial property, including
patents, is to be understood "in the broadest sense." 168 This language, together with the language of Article 27 of TRIPS, which is
clearly designed to eliminate all but specifically enumerated subject-matter exclusions from the field of patent law, 169 may eventually enable the United States to convince a dispute panel that
software inventions cannot be excluded from patent protection
solely on the ground that software is not patentable subject-matter. 170 Because Article 27, in any event, creates a new international
obligation, a dispute settlement panel faced with interpreting Article 27 is said to be less likely to refer to practice under pre-existing
17 1
conventions and will tend to rely more strictly on the TRIPS text.
If such an argument ultimately prevails, the United States will
have managed to turn the focus of international debate over
165. TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, art. 27 n.5.
166. There is at least some support for this position in U.S. case law. Whereas
the lower federal courts have held that the application of mathematical formulae
either to physical elements (in apparatus claims) or to process steps (in process
claims) is sufficient to establish the validity of a software patent claim, the Supreme
Court, in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981), held only that a patent
claim containing a mathematical formula will be upheld if the overall function of
the formula is "transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing."
Id.; see generally McManis, supra note 106, at 96 (discussing Diamond v. Diehr and
other relevant precedent); Reichman, Know-How Gap, supranote 50, at 767-73 (discussing TRIPS's impact on computer programs).
167. For a discussion of Article 2 of TRIPS, see infra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
168. Paris Convention, supra note 26, art. 1(3). The complete text of which is
as follows:
(3) Industrial property shall be understood in the broadest sense and
shall apply not only to industry and commerce proper, but likewise to
agricultural and extractive industries and to all manufactured or natural
products, for example, wines, grain, tobacco, leaf, fruit, cattle, minerals,
mineral waters, beer, flowers, and flour.
Id. art. 1(3).
169. Id.; see, e.g., Reichman, Know-How Gap, supra note 50, at 769 (discussing
few exclusions permitted which do not include computer programs).
170. For expressions of continuing concern over the tendency of software patent applications to claim abstract formulae or laws of nature, see infra note 316
and accompanying text.
171. For a further discussion of Article 27, see Abbott, supra note 16.
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software patent protection to a second (and more difficult) generation of patent issues arising out of the requirement that an invention be new, useful and involve an inventive step. Because the
source-code version of publicly distributed software is so often protected as a trade secret,1 72 the paucity of publicly accessible prior
art is likely to lead to inevitable misjudgments in the patent examining process as to the novelty and nonobviousness of software-related
inventions and the appropriate scope of claims to such
1 73

inventions.

On the other hand, the United States is finally on the verge of
adhering to the customary practice of most patent systems throughout the world, by amending its patent law to automatically lay open
patent applications eighteen months after they are filed.17 4 This
amendment should go a long way toward assuring that patents will
issue only on software technology that meets the U.S. statutory standards of novelty and nonobviousness. Thus, it will give patent decisions of the USPTO a new credibility as the GATT/WTO dispute
resolution process struggles to develop an international minimum
standard for determining what constitutes an inventive step in com175
puter program technology.
A final software issue that might be raised before a WTO dispute panel is the extent to which WTO member countries are required to protect computer programs as trade secrets under Article
39 of TRIPS. As we have seen, Article 39 obliges members to pro172. For a further discussion of trade secrets, see generally McManis, supranote
106, at 32.
173. See 1 BENDER, supra note 164, § 3A.09A, at 3A-88 to 3A-88.4(5) (discussing software prior art problem and in particular, controversy over patent initially
granted to Encyclopedia Brittanica and assigned to Compton's New Media, which
"claimed the most popular methods for searching multimedia databases, yet was
anticipated by much earlier art"); Brian Kahin, The Software Patent Crisis, TECH.
REv., Apr. 1990, at 52, 53, 58 (discussing the general problem of overbroad
software patents). For statements of continuing concern over the risk that pure
software patents will extend patent protection to abstract ideas or "laws of nature,"
see infra note 316 and accompanying text.
174. SeePatent Application Act of 1995, H.R. 1733, 104th Cong. (1995) (revising U.S. patent laws to require publication of most patent applications 18 months
after earliest filing date).
175. To some extent, of course, differences in the standards employed in different national patent systems may simply have to be tolerated. See, e.g., Henri H.
Hanneman, Patentability of Computer Programs in Europe, in THE LAW OF INsrOmATION TECHNOLOGY IN EUROPE 1992-A COMPARISON wrrH THE USA 78, 85 (noting
that U.S. and Japanese patent offices are less restrictive in allowing computer-program related inventions than European Patent Office); see generally Reichman,
Know-How Gap, supra note 50, at 767-73 (discussing. TRIPS's impact on computer
programs).
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tect "undisclosed information." 176 The conceptual difficulty posed
by computer programs, of course, is that they can simultaneously be
publicly distributed (in object-code form) and maintained as a
trade secret (in source-code form).177 Thus, it is not entirely clear
whether, or under what circumstances, information contained in a
widely distributed object-code version of a program will or will not
be held to have been "disclosed."
According to Article 39(2) of TRIPS, information is to be protected from acquisition, disclosure or use contrary to "honest commercial practices" where the information:
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the
precise configuration and assembly of its components,
generally known among or readily accessible to persons
within circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question;
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the
information, to keep it secret. 178
This provision, which closely parallels both the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act' 79 and the recently issued Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, 180 imposes two interrelated conditions for the
protection of commercially valuable trade secret information. First,
the commercially valuable information must not be "generally
known" or "readily accessible" to others. Second, the person seeking trade secret protection must have taken "reasonable steps" to
maintain the secrecy of the information.
In an effort to take "reasonable steps" to maintain the secrecy
of the source-code version of publicly distributed programs, U.S.
software developers routinely employ contracts, including "shrinkwrap" licenses, purporting to prohibit the reverse engineering of
176. For the text of Article 39(1), see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
177. For a discussion of legal issues raised by computer programs, see supra
note 106 and accompanying text. See also McManis, supra note 106, at 31 (discussing "unique [ness] [of computers] in the field of intellectual property law. Computer programs function both as part of a machine, in their object-code form, and
as a means of communicating with other human beings, in their source-code form
178. TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, art. 39(2). For the text of Article 39(1),
see supra note 55.
179. 1979 Uniform Trade Secrets Act; 1985 Amendment to Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, reprinted in 2 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECaxTs LAW App. Al (1996).
180. RESTATEmENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETION §§ 39-40 (1995).
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publicly distributed object-code versions of the program. 18 1 According to Article 9 of the EC Directive, of course, any contractual
provision-whether a shrink-wrap license or not-that is contrary
to the reverse engineering privileges enumerated in Article 6 and
Article 5(2) and (3) of the EC Directive is null and void, apparently
182
even for programs that have not been publicly distributed.
Under U.S. law, shrink-wrap licenses purporting to prohibit the reverse engineering of otherwise publicly distributed programs may
or may not be preempted by federal copyright and/or patent
law. 183 Thus, an international conflict may well arise over the enforceability of contracts purporting to restrict reverse engineering
of computer programs.
The United States could conceivably argue before a WTO dispute panel that, to the extent Article 9 of the EC Directive voids
bilateral contracts prohibiting reverse engineering of programs that
have not been publicly distributed, it violates Article 39 of TRIPS.
The European Union would undoubtedly respond that Article 40
of TRIPS specifically provides that nothing in the TRIPS agreement
"shall prevent Members from specifying in their [national] legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases
constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse
effect on competition in the relevant market."18 4 A TRIPS panel
would thus be called on to reconcile the obligation of members to
protect undisclosed information under Article 39 of TRIPS with the
right of members under Article 40 to prevent abusive licensing
practices.
While it is impossible to predict exactly how WTO dispute
panels might resolve this or any other international dispute over
181. See McManis, supra note 106, at 79-80 (discussing software developers'
reliance on shrink-wrap licenses, although enforceability is questionable).
182. For a discussion of Article 9(1), see supra note 150 and accompanying
text.
183. For a discussion of U.S. law and shrink-wrap licenses, see supra notes 145,
151 and accompanying text. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and
Shrink Wrap Licenses, 68 So. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995) (discussing software vendors'
attempts to use contract law to protect their products rather than copyright law
and enforceability of those contracts); David P. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract
and Public Policy: FederalPreemption of Software License ProhibitionsAgainst Reverse Engineering, 53 U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 543, 594, 630 (1992) (arguing that shrink-wrap
licenses are preempted by federal copyright and/or patent law); see also McManis,
supra note 106, at 90 (suggesting that U.S. copyright might preempt reverse engineering restrictions in contracts other than shrink-wrap licenses). But see ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that shrink-wrap
licenses are enforceable contracts and are not preempted by federal copyright
law). For a further discussion of ProCD, see supra note 145 and accompanying text.
184. TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, art. 40.
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the scope of copyright, patent or trade secret protection for computer programs, it should be clear from this brief discussion that
most disputes over the scope of intellectual property protection for
computer programs are at least amenable to resolution through the
WTO dispute settlement process. Nor should the potential for such
disputes obscure the larger international consensus that seems to
be emerging on the need to promote interoperability of computer
programs.
In addition to the dispute of the interoperability of computer
programs, the new TRIPS agreement and its associated dispute settlement process face a more complicated series of disputes over the
protection of intellectual property on the global information
superhighway.
IV.

THE EMERGING GLOBAL INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY

The protection of intellectual property on the emerging global
information superhighway poses several difficult challenges for the
new TRIPS agreement and the associated WTO dispute settlement
process. Here, the concern is not so much with the intellectual
property rights of the various "builders" of the information superhighway as with the intellectual property rights of the various
"builders" of the digital information (i.e., the "vehicles") which will
traverse the information superhighway.1 8 5 The core substantive issue is how to protect the intellectual property rights of digital content providers without unduly burdening the ability of either online access and service providers-i.e., "commercial distributors"or the end-using "consumers" of digital information to make efficient and perhaps even innovative use of digital information.
Already the prospect of an emerging global information superhighway has sparked two separate, but interrelated, intellectual
property debates in the industrialized world. The first debate concerns the European Union's Directive on the Legal Protection of
Databases ("Database Directive"),a186 which seeks to create a new, sui
generis form of protection for the noncopyrightable contents of
databases and to condition the protection of works originating in
185. Digital information has been described both as the "cars" and as the
"cargo" traversing the information superhighway. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting
Cars on the "InformationSuperhighway", Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace,
95 COLUM. L. REv. 1466, 1467 (1995) (referring to "car" paradigm); Christopher
Millard & Robert Carolina, Commercial Transactions on the Global Information Infrastructure: A European Perspective, 14 J. MARsHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 269, 271
(1996) (referring to "cargo" paradigm).
186. Database Directive, supra note 9.
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other countries on a reciprocal grant of protection for European
databases in those countries. The second debate concerns the proposals contained in the U.S. White Paper on Intellectual Property
and the National Information Infrastructure (the "White Paper"),187 for ensuring adequate intellectual property protection on
the global information superhighway for digital versions of more
traditional literary and artistic works.
These two initiatives are particularly important because they
apparently represent a coordinated effort on the part of the United
States and the European Union to fashion a new international
agreement, in the form of a protocol to the Berne Convention, for
the protection of intellectual property on the global information
superhighway.188 Yet both initiatives also create the potential for
conflict with the TRIPS agreement or the associated GATT/WTO
framework.' 89
A. Sui Generis Database Protection
On March 11, 1996, the European Parliament and the Council
of Ministers for European Union finally adopted a long proposed
and much amended Directive on the Legal Protection of
Databases. 190 The Database Directive basically takes a two-tiered approach to database protection: Chapter II of the Database Directive (Articles 3 through 6) essentially harmonizes European law
with respect to the grant of copyright protection for expressive elements of a compilation of data, while Chapter III (Articles 7
through 11) creates a new sui generis form of protection for the
noncopyrightable data itself.' 9 '
A primary goal of the Database Directive, as originally proposed in 1992, prior to the completion of the Uruguay Round, was
187. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10 at 211-37.

188. For a discussion of the efforts to draft a new protocol to the Berne Convention, see infra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.

189. For a discussion of potential conflicts between TRIPS or the Berne and
Paris Conventions and the Database Directive, see infra notes 218-20 and accompa-

nying text. For a discussion of the potential conflicts between the White Paper
proposals and the GATT/WTO framework, see infra notes 305-10 and accompanying text.
190. Database Directive, supra note 9. For a summary of the provision contained in the proposed Database Directive at various points during the three-year
drafting and deliberation process, compare Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 59,
at 2493-97 with Laurence M. Kaye, The Proposed EU Directivefor the Legal Protection of
Databases: A Cornerstone of the Information Society, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 583
(1995).
191. See generally Kaye, supra note 190 (discussing new rights created by

Directive).
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to harmonize European law governing copyright protection for
databases. At the time, the domestic law of member states varied
widely. The copyright law of most member states protected only
the original expressive elements of a database, just as the United
States Supreme Court had recently reaffirmed in its decision in Feist
Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 192 holding that a mere
alphabetical listing of data did not constitute an original work of
authorship under U.S. copyright law. 19 3 A handful of countries,
however, granted sui generis protection for noncopyrightable data
itself, while Great Britain, the main supplier of information services
in Europe, granted full copyright protection for databases, so long
as "mere skill, judgement and labor" was used in the development
1 94
of the database.
By the time of the Database Directive's final adoption, however, the goal of harmonizing copyright protection for databases
had, to some extent, already been accomplished in Article 10 of the
TRIPS agreement. As we have seen, according to Article 10
"[c]ompilations of data or other material whether in machine readable or other form, which by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual creations shall be
protected as such."' 95 Article 10 explicitly adds that, such protec196
tion "shall not extend to the data or material itself."
Thus, the most important-and controversial-aspect of the final Database Directive is its creation of a new, sui generis form of
protection for the contents of databases. According to Article 7 of
the Database Directive, the maker of a database (electronic or
otherwise) "which shows that there has been qualitatively and/or
quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents to prevent extraction and/
or re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated
quantitatively, and/or qualitatively, of the contents of that
database.... [This] right ...shall apply irrespective of the eligibility of that database for [copyright protection] ."97
192. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
193. Id. at 362; see Debra B. Rosler, The European Union's Proposed Directivefor
the Legal Protection of Databases: A New Threat to the Free How of Information, 10 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 105, 110 (1995) (discussing various approaches of European Union
members to database protection and effect Database Directive would have).
194. Rosler, supra note 193, at 110, 113, 134-36.
195. TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, art. 10. For a further discussion of Article 10, see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
196. TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, art. 10. For a further discussion of Article 10, see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
197. See Database Directive, supra note 9, art. 7(1), (4).
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Extraction is defined as "the permanent or temporary transfer
of all or a substantial part of the contents of a database to another
medium by any means or in any form," and re-utilization is defined
as "any form of making available to the public all or a substantial
part of the contents of a database by distribution of copies, by rent198
ing, by on-line or other forms of transmission."
Article 8 provides that "[t]he maker of a database which is
made available to the public in whatever manner may not prevent a
lawful user of the database from extracting and/or re-utilizing insubstantial parts of its contents, evaluated qualitatively and/or
quantitatively, for any purpose whatsoever." 199 Article 15 adds that
20 0
any contractual provision contrary to Article 8 is null and void.
Article 7(5), however, qualifies the user's right to extract and
reutilize insubstantial parts of a database, stating that "[t]he repeated and systematic extraction and/or re-utilization of insubstantial parts of the contents of the database implying acts which
conflict with [the] normal exploitation of that database or which
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the maker of the
201
database [is] not to be permitted."
Article 9 permits (but does not require) member states to "stipulate that users of a database which is made available to the public
...may, without the authorization of its maker, extract or re-utilize
a substantial part of its contents" in three limited circumstances
somewhat analogous to fair use in copyright law-namely: (a) "extraction for private purposes of the contents of a non-electronic
database;" (b) "extraction for the purposes of illustration for teaching or scientific research, as long as the source is indicated and to
the extentjustified by the non-commercial purpose to be achieved;"
and (c) "extraction and/or re-utilization for the purposes of public
security or an administrative or judicial procedure." 20 2 It should be
noted, however, that the first exception, extraction for "private purposes," does not apply to extractions from electronic databases. Additionally, the third exception does not apply to extractions for
other than essentially "public" (i.e., governmental) purposes.
Thus, the extraction of a qualitatively or quantitatively substantial part of the contents of an electronic database for other than a
governmental purpose will be justifiable only if it is for the purpose
198. Id. art. 7(2).
199. Id. art. 8(1).
200. Id. art. 15.
201. Id. art. 7(5).
202. Id. art. 9. For a discussion of the fair use doctrine in copyright law, see
supra notes 48-49, 139-40 and accompanying text.
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of illustration for teaching or scientific research. Any other substantial extraction from an electronic database will be infringing,
irrespective of whether the extraction is for a commercial purpose,
such as market research or private investment decisions, or for a
wholly noncommercial purpose, such as religious canvassing, political polling, genealogical research or pursuit of any other hobby or

avocation. 203

Article 10 specifies that the term of protection is to be for a
period of fifteen years, measured either from the year the database
is completed or the year that the database is made available to the
public, provided that it is made public no later than fifteen years
after the year it was completed. 20 4 Article 10 goes on to state that
any substantial change to the contents of the database, including
those "resulting from the accumulation of successive additions, deletions or alterations, which would result in the database being considered to be a substantial new investment . . . [will] qualify the
database resulting from that investment for its own term of protection."20 5 As the maker or rightholder of an electronic database is
under no obligation to distinguish the original contents of the
database from those additions or alterations constituting a substantial new investment, this article appears to give an electronic
database maker or rightholder potentially perpetual exclusive
rights in the entire database, so long as substantial updating can be
206
shown to occur every fifteen years.
Article 11 states that the beneficiaries of this new sui genris
right are to include: (1) database "makers or rightholders [who]
are nationals of a Member State or who have their habitual residence in the territory of the [European] Community" and (2)
"companies and firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration
or principal place of business within the [European] Community."20 7 Where "a company or firm has only its registered office in
203. For a critical comparison of this limited fair use privilege and the exceptions and limitations that safeguard the public interest in copyright law, see infra
note 213.
204. Database Directive, supra note 9, art. 10(1), (2).
205. Id. art. 10(3).
206. See Kaye, supra note 190, at 586 (comparing publication in CD-ROM or
other fixed format with electronic database publication noting that contents of
first edition of fixed-format database will fallout of protection and into public
domain at end of first 15 years and thereafter can be freely copied, and concluding
that this "is one of the reasons why databases in on-line form, which will be subject
to a more regular update, will obtain stronger protection under the [Database]
Directive").
207. Database Directive, supra note 9, art. 11(1), (2).
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the territory of the [European] Community, [however,] its operations must be genuinely linked on an ongoing basis with the econ20 8
omy of a Member State."
Article 11 concludes by stating that international agreements
extending the sui generis right to all other databases made in third
countries are to be concluded by the European Council acting on
proposals from the European Commission. 20 9 Recital 56 of the preamble to the Database Directive makes it clear that such agreements are to be concluded only if such third countries offer
comparable protection to databases produced by nationals or habit210
ual residents of a member state of the European Community.
The question whether the grant of such sui geners protection is
desirable, and if so, whether the Database Directive appropriately
defines the scope of that protection, has been much debated elsewhere 2 1 ' and need not be detailed here. It is sufficient to say that
commentators have called the Database Directive everything from a
potential "cornerstone of the information society" (for having rescued database publishers from the perils of under-protection), 21 2 to
a "legal monstrosity" (for having endowed electronic database publishers with potentially perpetual exclusive rights in disembodied
information and data structures, without analogous exceptions and
limitations that typically safeguard the public interest under existing copyright laws).213
208. Id. art. 11(2).
209. Id. art. 11(3).
210. Recital 56 of the Database Directive states that:
[T]he right to prevent unauthorized extraction and/or re-utilization in
respect of a database should apply to databases whose makers are nationals or habitual residents of third countries or to those produced by legal
persons not established in a Member State, within the meaning of the
Treaty, only if such third countries offer comparable protection to
databases produced by nationals of a Member State or persons who have
their habitual residence in the territory of the Community.

Id. para. 56.
211. For a flavor of this debate, see infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
212. Kaye, supra note 190 at 588.
213. Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 59, at 2496, contends that:
In attempting to rescue database publishers ineligible for copyright protection from the perils of "parasitic" competition, the drafters endow
them with perpetual exclusive rights to disembodied information and
database structures but neglect to recreate analogues to the many exceptions and limitations that otherwise safeguard the public interest under
copyright laws.
Id. For a critique of the economic consequences of such protection, see infra note
289 and accompanying text. It should be noted that Reichman was actually commenting on an early version of the Database Directive, which, as it turned out, had
only begun to mutate as the "monstrosity" that Reichman deplored. For example,
Reichman noted with relief that "to avoid erecting inadvertent barriers to entry,
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Some commentators have argued that the grant of any protecdon for database contents is inconsistent with a basic premise of
copyright law that "upholds the free dissemination of information
by precluding protection of facts and news."2 14 That premise, as we
have seen, finds expression in Article 10 of the TRIPS agreement,
which states that copyright protection for compilations of data or
other material shall not extend to the data or material itself.2 15 The

problem with this argument is that Article 10 of TRIPS merely prohibits extending copyright protection to the contents of a database,
but falls considerably short of explicitly prohibiting any form of
protection for database contents. Article 39 of TRIPS, for example,
clearly permits, and indeed requires, member countries to provide
trade secret protection for nonpublicly disclosed databases. 2 16 Article 1 of TRIPS, in turn, specifically permits member countries to
implement in their domestic law more extensive protection than is
required by the TRIPS agreement, provided that such protection
2 17
does not contravene any provision of the TRIPS agreement.
A more debatable question under TRIPS, however, is whether
granting such sui generis protection to databases made by nationals
or habitual residents of Europe, coupled with a material reciprocity
provision conditioning the protection of databases originating in
other countries on the reciprocal grant of protection in those countries for databases of European nationals or habitual residents, is
compatible with the national treatment provisions of the new
TRIPS agreement itself or the apparently incorporated national
treatment provisions contained in the Paris and Berne Conventions. 2 18 The Database Directive was obviously drafted with the aim
of keeping database protection outside the reach of the national
treatment obligations of either the TRIPS agreement or the Berne
Convention.2 19 It has been suggested, however, that the new "data
right" might nevertheless fall within the meaning of "industrial
the [proposed] Directive provides compulsory licenses whenever the database
makers become the sole sources of the contents in publicly available, electronic
databases or when the contents of such databases emanate from public bodies that
benefit from a natural monopoly." Id. By 1995, however, much to the reported
relief of most database producers, the compulsory licensing provision had been
dropped. Kaye, supra note 190, at 587.
214. Rosler, supra note 193, at 136.
215. For a discussion of Article 10, see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
216. For a discussion of Article 39, see supra notes 176-79 and accompanying
text.
217. TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, art. 1.
218. For a discussion of the Paris and Berne Conventions and the TRIPS
agreement, see supra notes 30-51 and accompanying text.
219. Rosler, supra note 193, at 137.
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in the broadest sense," as set out in Article 1 (3) of the

Paris Convention and might even be characterized as a right to prevent a new species of "unfair competition," within the meaning of
Article 10 b' of that Convention. Thus, it might be subject to the
220
national treatment obligations imposed by the Paris Convention.
Even prior to the TRIPS agreement-when the United States
created sui generis protection for semiconductor chip designs and
attached a reciprocity provision, requiring other countries wishing
to receive chip design protection in the United States to protect
designs from the United States on substantially the same basisother countries adhering to the Paris Convention could have ar-

gued plausibly that chip design protection was simply a new species
of industrial property protection (namely, a new type of utility
model protection) and was thus subject to the national treatment
requirements of the Paris Convention.2 2 1 Because of the absence of
any effective dispute resolution process under the Paris Convention, however, no such argument was ever made.
Today, by contrast, such an argument could be raised in the
context of the WTO dispute settlement process. A WTO member
country objecting to the Database Directive's reciprocity requirement could plausibly claim that, even if the Database Directive manages to escape the reach of the national treatment provisions of the
TRIPS agreement and the Berne Convention, the "data right" that
it creates is nevertheless a kind of industrial property, in the
broadest sense, as envisioned in the Paris Convention. 22 2 Thus, the
reciprocity provision in the Database Directive arguably violates the
national treatment provisions of the Paris Convention, and consequently violates Article 2 of TRIPS, which seemingly obliges WTO
members to comply with Articles 1 to 12 and 19 of the Paris
Convention.223

This argument, however, raises a fundamental interpretive
question as to the meaning of Article 2 of the TRIPS agreement
and the relationship between TRIPS and the Paris Convention. In
actuality, Article 2 of TRIPS states only that " [i] n respect of Parts II,
220. Geller, supranote 48, at 110. For the full text of Article 1(3) of the Paris
Convention, see supra note 168.
221. Geller, supra note 48, at 100. Cf McManis, supra note 76, at 354 (suggesting that semiconductor chip design protection could be characterized as species of utility model protection).
222. For a discussion of the Database Directive's compatability with TRIPS
and the Berne Convention, see supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
223. For a discussion of the Paris Convention and TRIPS, see supra notes 3033, 37-41 and accompanying text.
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III, and IV of this Agreement, Members shall comply with Articles 112 and 19 of the Paris Convention." Parts II, III and IV of TRIPS
are entirely concerned with the availability, scope, use, enforcement, acquisition and maintenance of rights in "intellectual property," which is defined in Article 1 as all (and presumably only)
those categories of intellectual property that are the subject of sections 1 to 7 of Part 11.224 Because Part II of TRIPS does not include-and in fact in one article (Article 10) specifically excludes
the possibility of-a data right as such, it could be argued that
WTO members are obligated to comply with the Paris Convention,
including its national treatment provision, only insofar as "intellectual property," as defined in TRIPS, happens to be involved.
On the other hand, Part II, section 7 of TRIPS, which consists
of but a single article (namely Article 39, which is specifically concerned with the protection of undisclosed information), begins
with the statement that "[i]n the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition as provided in Article 10' of the
Paris Convention (1967), Members shall protect undisclosed information in accordance with paragraph 2 [below] ."225 This statement suggests that WTO Member countries have an independent
obligation under Article 2 of TRIPS to provide effective protection
against unfair competition as provided in Article 10, of the Paris
Convention, whether or not any undisclosed information or other
forms of "intellectual property" specifically enumerated in Part II of
TRIPS happen to be involved.2 2 6 If this is indeed held to be the
case, it would seem to follow that WTO member countries also have
an obligation under Article 2 of TRIPS to accord national treatment under the Paris Convention both with respect to the protection of industrial property, understood in the broadest sense, and
with respect to the prevention of unfair competition, whether or
not the unfair competition happens to involve a form of intellectual
property enumerated in Part II of TRIPS.
224. For a summary of the contents of Parts II to LV of TRIPS, see supra text
following note 24. For a summary of the contents of sections 1-7 of Part II and text
of Article 1, see supra note 39. For the text of Articles 10 and 39, see supra notes
42-44, 55, 178 and accompanying text.
225. TRIPS agreement, supra note 6, art. 39(1).
226. For the text of Articles 2 and 39 of TRIPS, see supra notes 38, 55. It
seems unlikely that either the European Union or the United States would concede, for example, that developing countries, such as India, which are members of
WTO, but are not currently members of the Paris Convention, have no independent obligation under TRIPS to prevent passing off, trade disparagement or other
forms of deceptive marketing that do not happen to involve infringement of intellectual property rights.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss1/5

54

McManis: Taking Trips on the Information Superhighway: International Intel

1996]

TRIPS

ON THE INFORMATION

SUPERHIGHWAY

In resolving this seemingly technical interpretive question, a
WTO dispute panel would in effect be determining Whether or not
the TRIPS agreement is capable of halting the Balkanization of international intellectual property law.2 27 For Article 2 of TRIPS to

succeed in stabilizing the bipolar structure of the Paris-Berne regime, it would need to be interpreted so as to require WTO member countries to accord national treatment in the grant of any form
of sui generis protection that could be characterized either as protecting industrial property, understood in the broadest sense, or
preventing unfair competition. Any other interpretation of Article
2 would in effect allow the proliferation of sui generis forms of intel-

lectual property protection to continue and would encourage countries with sufficient economic power to continue utilizing
reciprocity provisions as a means of foisting these new forms of protection off on the rest of the world.
This seems to be exactly the purpose of the reciprocity provision in the Database Directive. Some critics of the Database Directive argue that a preferable course for the European Union would
have been to follow the advice of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) and the European Union's own High-Level
Group on the Information Society and submit a proposal to amend
the Berne Convention. 228 The problem, of course, is that by the
express terms of Article 27 of the Berne Convention and by longstanding practice under the Paris Convention, the two Great Conventions can be amended only by unanimous consent of their
members. 229 It was the very inability of the industrialized world to
obtain such unanimous consent that initially injected the issue of
intellectual property protection into international trade negotiations and eventually led to the TRIPS agreement.23 0
Evidence is mounting, however, that the European Union and
the United States intend to use Article 20 of the Berne Convention,
which permits members to enter into special agreements among
themselves to grant authors more extensive rights than those
granted by the Berne Convention, to accomplish the functional
equivalent of an amendment to the Berne Convention, in the form
of a possible Berne protocol and "new instrument." One purpose
of the protocol will likely be to enhance database protection and
227. For a discussion of TRIPS's ability to deal with this Balkanization, see
supra notes 56, 79-80 and accompanying text.
228. Rosier, supra note 193, at 136-37.
229. For a discussion of the process of amending the Berne and Paris Conventions, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
230. Id.
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the protection of intellectual property on the global information
superhighway.231 Thus, the Database Directive may simply be a preliminary device for unifying the European Union on database protection and improving its bargaining position viz a viz the United
States, which apparently hopes to convince the European Union
that the protocol should also enhance the scope of copyright protection for digital versions of what currently represents a substantial
percentage of U.S. exports-namely audiovisual and musical works,
sound recordings and computer programs.
At the recent urging of the United States and the European
Union, the WIPO reportedly moved a step closer to convening a
"'diplomatic conference' to draft a protocol to the Berne Convention that would include new digital technologies and a possible
'new instrument' to protect copyrights in phonograms." 23 2 Commenting on a recent meeting of a WIPO appointed Committee of

Experts, the chairman of the committee (a European) stated that
"there was practically unanimous agreement that questions related

to transmission, communication to the public, and public performance-as well as digital transmission-should be addressed in the
proposed protocol."233
On behalf of the United States, an official of the USPTO urged
that the WIPO address this issue at the upcoming diplomatic conference, scheduled in principle to take place in December 1996
and stated in passing that "the United States supports an EU proposal on the table for possible international harmonization of a sui
23 4
generis form of protection for databases."
In order to understand what the United States hopes to gain

from this apparent bilateral bargain in the making, it is necessary to
turn to the recently issued White Paper.

231. The possibility of a new Berne Convention protocol has been looming
for quite some time. See, e.g., Ralph Oman, Berne Revision: The ContinuingDrama, 4
FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 139, 146 (1993) (noting that WIPO first
formally tabled new subjects for possible inclusion in protocol in November 1991).
The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1993, however, apparently
served to change the focus of these ongoing deliberations. See generally Ralph
Oman, Intellectual PropertyAfter the Uruguay Round, 42J. COPRGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 18,
37-38 (1994) (discussing WIPO agenda coming out of GATr).
232. W1PO Moves on Berne Conference to Draft New Technology Protection, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 250 (Feb. 14, 1996).
233. Id.
234. Id.
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In September 1995, the Clinton administration's Working
Group on Intellectual Property Rights issued its White Paper (i.e.,
final report), entitled Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure. 35 Significantly, the White Paper was released simultaneously in Washington, D.C. and at a meeting of the
WIPO, in Geneva, Switzerland.2 36 The White Paper makes clear
that its proposals for amending U.S. copyright law to enhance domestic protection for digital works are also intended as a model for
a possible Berne Convention protocol currently being considered
23 7
by the Committee of Experts that WIPO has convened.
The White Paper's proposed amendments to existing U.S.
copyright law have already sparked considerable critical comment
in the United States. Although the White Paper characterizes its
proposed amendments as no more than "the fine tuning that technological advances necessitate, in order to maintain the balance of
the law in the face of onrushing technology,"2 38 critics have characterized the proposed amendments as a "copyright grab," that will
radically change the balance in copyright law, maximizing copyright protection for digital works, with little consideration given to
the right of the public to access and use those works.2 39 These critics argue that the proposed amendments, which were introduced
into both houses of Congress at the end of September 1995,24 0 will
in effect "transform the emerging information superhighway into a
24 1
publisher-dominated toll road."
235. WHITE

PAPER, supra note 10.
236. Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright and the National Information Infrastructurein the
United States, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 120, 125 (1996).
237. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 149-55. See generally Samuelson, supra
note 80, at 26 (discussing efforts to achieve international harmonization).
238. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 17.
239. Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 135 [hereinafter Samuelson Copyright Grab]; see also Pamela Samuelson, The NII IntellectualProperty Report, 37 COMM. OF THE ACM 21, 22 (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter Samuelson, NIl
IntellectualProperty Report]. Regarding the initial draft of the NII Report, Samuelson concludes:
To put the point plainly, let me say that not since the King of England in
the 16th century gave a group of printers exclusive rights to print books
in exchange for the printers' agreement not to print heretical or seditious material has a government copyright policy been so skewed in favor
of publisher interests and so detrimental to the public interest.
Id.
240. See National Information Infrastructure Copyright Protection Act of
1995, S. 1284, 104th Cong. (1995) and H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing
amendment of copyright laws to adopt to NII).
241. Samuelson, Copyright Grab, supra note 239, at 135.
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The controversy over the White Paper is not limited to the effect of the amendments it proposes to U.S. copyright law; it extends
as well to its view of the scope of existing copyright protection in
the United States. Far from being an objective statement, the
White Paper's review of existing law is said to take on the qualities
of a partisan brief, adopting the position of the copyright industry
on virtually every controversial issue of the day, without even ac2 42
knowledging that contrary arguments or authority exists.
The particular points of controversy can best be understood by
reference to the exclusive rights that U.S. copyright law confers on
copyright owners. Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act 243 provides that, subject to a variety of limitations, including the fair use
privilege contained in section 107, owners of a copyright are to
have five exclusive rights, consisting of the right "(1) to reproduce
the copyrighted work ... ; (2) to prepare derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies ... of the copyrighted work to the public... ; [and (in the case of some but not all
categories of works)] (4) ... to perform ... publicly; and (5) ... to
244
display the copyrighted work publicly."
The first point of controversy concerns the current scope of
the reproduction right, as it applies to (1) computer network users
and (2) electronic bulletin board operators and on-line service or
access providers. The White Paper takes the position that under
existing U.S. copyright law, a potentially infringing reproduction
occurs whenever "a work is placed in a computer, whether on a
disk, diskette, [read-only memory (ROM)] or other storage device,"
or even in a computer's random access memory (RAM) if the work
2 45
remains in RAM for more than a "very brief period."
If the latter part of this reading of U.S. copyright law is indeed
correct, it will severely restrict the ability of computer network users
to lawfully "browse" copyrighted digital works. Because a work cannot be accessed on a computer without a copy being made in RAM,
it has been suggested that the White Paper's approach to fixation
and copying will in effect confer on copyright owners an "exclusive
right to read," enabling them to charge royalties for virtually all
electronic browsing of copyrighted works.2 46 Of course, electronic
242. Kurtz, supra note 236, at 120.

243. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
244. Id.
245. WHrrE PAPER, supra note

10, at 65.

246. See Samuelson, Copyright Grab, supra note 239, at 137; see alsoJessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CaDozo ARTS & ENT. LJ. 29, 31-32 (1994)
(describing draft of White Paper as "enhanc[ing] the exclusive rights in the copy-
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"browsing" is not exactly the same as browsing a hard copy of a
work in a library or a bookstore. A closer analogy would be to
browsing a copyrighted slide collection or a microfilm using a projector that is also capable, either automatically or with a single
keystroke, of photocopying all or parts of the copyrighted work.
On the other hand, neither is entering a work in a computer's RAM
exactly the same as entering it in other forms of electronic storage
or memory as RAM loses all of its information when the computer
2
is turned off.

47

A work which resides only in the RAM of a computer, and not
in more permanent storage, is arguably not "fixed" within the
meaning of section 101 of the Copyright Act, which defines a work
as fixed when its embodiment in a material object "is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration."2 48 The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act confirms
that this definition of fixation is designed to exclude "purely evanescent or transient reproductions such as those projected briefly
on a screen, shown electronically on a television or other cathode
ray tube, or captured momentarily in the 'memory' of a
2 49
computer."
The White Paper, on the other hand, concludes that a work
which resides in RAM for more than a "very brief period" is necessarily fixed, irrespective of any other indicia of permanence or stability in the work's embodiment in a material object.2 50 While the
right bundle so far as to give the copyright owner the exclusive right to control
reading").
247. See BradleyJ. Nicholson, The Ghost in the Machines: MAI Systems Corp. v.
Peak Computer, Inc. and the Problem of Copying in RAM, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 147,
148-50 (1995) (describing how RAM operates).
248. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). A work may be fixed, within the meaning of
§ 101 of the Copyright Act, if it is automatically "saved" on the hard drive of a
browser's computer. A work may also be fixed if it is "mirrored" or "cached" in the
server of an on-line service or access provider. Mirroring involves replication of
information available at commonly visited ftp sites. Caching involves retaining
copies of Web pages that have previously been visited by customers of that services.
For a further discussion of mirroring and caching, and the White Paper's failure to
discuss either, see Samuelson, Copyright Grab, supra note 239, at 26-27.
249. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666.
Early on, the White Paper cites this statement from the legislative history without
comment but later chooses to ignore it and still later appears to repudiate it.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 28, 65-66. For a discussion of this aspect of the
White Paper, see infra note 250.
250. The White Paper cites, with apparent approval, a trial court case, Advanced Computer Senvices of Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Systems Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.
Va. 1994), which comes to the bizarre conclusion that fixation of a program in
RAM is somehow confirmed, not refuted, by the argument that it "disappears from
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White Paper can admittedly cite case law for the proposition that
loading a computer program into RAM amounts to making a
copy, 2 5' neither the cases nor the White Paper's own position can
withstand close scrutiny,2 52 which is probably why the White Paper
attempts to characterize the point as well-settled and later tries to
argue that the meaning of the 1976 Copyright Act is so clear that
the legislative history can be entirely disregarded.2 5 3
RAM the instant the computer is turned off," but then concedes that if the computer is turned off within seconds or fractions of a second of the loading, "the
resulting RAM representation of the program arguably would be too ephemeral to
be considered 'fixed' or a 'copy' under the Act." Id. at 363. This is apparently
what the White Paper means by a "very brief period." WHITE PAPER, supra note 10,
at 65 n.202.
251. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 65 (citing, inter alia, MAI Sys. Corp. v.
Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993)).
252. For a critique of the MA/ Systems case, on which the White Paper relies,
see Nicholson, supra note 247, at 165-74. For critiques of the White Paper itself on
this point, see Litman, supra note 246, at 40-43 and Samuelson, Copyright Grab,
supra note 239, at 135-38.
The White Paper also relies on a 1978 report, called the CONTU Final Report, which recommended changes to U.S. copyright law that would explicitly acknowledge that computer programs are copyrightable works. CONTU Final
Report, supra note 109. The CONTU Final Report noted that "[it] he introduction
of a work into a computer memory would, consistent with the [current] law, be a
reproduction of the work." Litman, supra note 246, at 40.
But the White Paper (and the CONTU Final Report) failed to point out that
the phrase "computer memory" can mean different things. Currently, computer
memory is understood as consisting of (1) RAM (random access memory), also
known as "volatile" or short-term memory, because it is composed of evanescent
electric signals that will disappear when the computer is turned off; (2) ROM
(read only memory), which consists of information permanently imprinted on a
computer chip or, more recently, on a CD-ROM; and (3) other forms of storage
(also known as secondary memory, to distinguish it from RAM and ROM), which
utilize such magnetic media as floppy discs, tapes or a computer's hard drive. See
Nicholson, supra note 247, at 148-49. Merely because storing a work in the second
and third type of memory constitutes a reproduction does not necessarily mean
that storing a work in RAM is a reproduction. The author is indebted to Dr. Will
D. Gillett, Associate Professor of Computer Science at Washington University, for
his helpful comments on what the term "computer memory" can be said to encompass. For a critique of the original CONTU Final Report, including its technical
shortcomings with respect to this particular point, see Samuelson, Case Against
Copyright Protection, supra note 109, at 694-705.
253. WHITE PAPER, supranote 10, at 72 n.226. The White Paper acknowledges
that the 1976 Act's legislative history describing the new display right, distinguishes
displays "on a screen or a tube" from reproductions, but dismisses the significance
of this statement, saying:
This language, written before the advent of the personal computer, applies easily to displays with which Congress was familiar in 1976 (those
rendered by broadcast receivers), but is inapplicable to digital "browsing"
where the law itself clearly-without resort to explanatory Congressional
language-defines such acts as implicating the display and reproduction
rights.
Id. By this sleight of hand, the White Paper is apparently able to ignore an earlier
remark in that same legislative history, explicitly stating that the definition of "fixa-
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For example, according to the logic of the White Paper, one
who uses a microfilm or slide projector to project an image on a
screen for more than a "very brief period" (whatever that means)
would in effect be "reproducing," and not merely "displaying," the
image on the screen. 254 Thus, even though such a display may not
be public (and would thus not infringe the "public display" right),
the hapless operator of the projector could nevertheless be said to
have infringed the copyright holder's exclusive reproduction right.
Yet, the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act states quite
clearly that "the showing of images on a screen or tube" will not be
a violation of the reproduction right, although it might come
within the scope of the public display right.2 55 Nor can it be argued
that RAM is more analogous to the microfilm or slide than to the
image on the screen, for like the image on the screen, but unlike
the microfilm or the slide, the contents of RAM disappear when the
computer is turned off.
In an effort to bolster its position, the White Paper hastens to
note thatjust because copying has occurred does not mean that an
infringement has occurred. The White Paper cites as possible escape hatches the fair use privilege and other statutory exemptions,
as well as the judicially created doctrine that de minimis copying
will not result in liability. 25 6 But the White Paper's own ambiguous
stance on the fair use privilege offers electronic browsers little cause
tion" in the 1976 Act would "exclude from the concept purely evanescent or transient reproductions such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown
electronically on a television or other cathode ray tube, or captured momentarily
in the memory' of a computer." H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666. For a discussion of the White Paper's disregard of the
legislative history, see supranote 249-52 and accompanying text. In actuality, Congress seems to have had a clearer understanding of computer technology in 1976
than its own expert commission, known as CONTU, had in 1978. For a discussion
of CONTU and computer memory, see supra note 252.
254. This is essentially the hypothetical described in MAI Systems:
[O]ne need only imagine a scenario where the computer, with the program loaded into RAM, is left on for extended periods of time, say
months or years, or indeed left on for the life of the computer. In this
event, the RAM version of the program is surely not ephemeral or transient; it is, instead, essentially permanent and thus plainly sufficiently
fixed to constitute a copy under the Act.
845 F. Supp. at 363. On the strength of this unlikely scenario and in apparent
disregard of the language and the legislative history of the Copyright Act, the court
concludes that a work is also fixed in RAM where, as in the case before it, "the
computer is left on for a time measured in minutes, if not longer." Id. For a
discussion of the Copyright Act, see supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
255. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675.
For the White Paper's dubious attempt to dismiss this piece of legislative history,
see supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
256. WHrrE PAPER, supra note 10, at 65 n.203.
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for reassurance. Early on, in an effort to characterize its proposed
amendments to the 1976 Copyright Act as no more than "fine tuning" of existing copyright law, the White Paper notes, but seemingly
rejects the argument that "because it may now be technically feasible to meter each use of a copyrighted work, and to charge a user a
fee for the use, the concept of fair use has no place in the NII environment."25 7 In its more extended discussion of the fair use doctrine, however, the White Paper concedes that "it may be that
technological means of tracking transactions and licensing will lead
to reduced application and scope of the fair use doctrine."2 58 In
other words, all that the White Paper rejects is an immediate legislative repeal of the fair use doctrine as it applies to the NII environment; it does not necessarily oppose, and even hints that it might
favor, judicial determinations reducing the application and scope
2 59
of the fair use doctrine in cyberspace.
The White Paper's conclusion about how the reproduction
right currently applies to electronic bulletin board operators and
on-line service or access providers is equally controversial. Here,
the controversy is not so much over the White Paper's view that
whenever a digitized file is "uploaded" from a user's computer to a
bulletin board system (BBS) or other server, or "downloaded" from
2 60
the BBS or other server, a potentially infringing copy is made.
Rather, the controversy is over its glib conclusions that (1) a BBS
operator or on-line service or access provider will be strictly liable,
under existing U.S. copyright law, as a direct infringer of the reproduction right, whenever a user uploads or downloads infringinging
material, whether or not the BBS operator or service or access provider has reason to know about infringement or has taken reasonable steps to prevent its occurrance and (2) that, in any event, a

257. Id. at 17.
258. Id. at 82 (citing American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F.
Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 37 F.3d 881, 892 (2d Cir. 1994), which established
liability "for the unauthorized photocopying of journal articles based in part on
the court's perception that obtaining a license for the right to make photocopies
via the Copyright Clearance Center was not unreasonably burdensome"). The
White Paper fails to add that, under the fair use doctrine, there would be a critical
difference between this case, where an academic journal sued a commercial enterprise for systematically photocopying articles, and the converse case, where a commercial digital content provider would be claiming that, given the availability of
metering, systematic electronic browsing by academics should not be considered
fair use.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 64-66.
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BBS operator or service or access provider will be vicariously liable
261
for the conduct of its users.
According to critics, this dubious reading of existing U.S. case
law would in effect impose an obligation on access and service providers to serve as "copyright police," without any particular regard to
whether this new industry is in fact capable of exercising that function.2 62 The White Paper is said to be "quite frank in its determina-

tion that on-line service providers should become centralized
control centers for enforcing copyright law,"2 63 while ignoring a va-

riety of constraints, including provisions of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 2 6 which might inhibit the industry's exercise

of that function.
In support of its view that under current U.S. copyright law online service providers directly infringe a copyright owner's reproduction right whenever a user uploads or downloads infringing material, the White Paper cites two recent trial court cases, both of
which involved only BBS operators as defendants, and both of
which were arguably decided on grounds other than a finding of
2 65
direct infringement of the copyright owner's reproduction right.

261. Id. at 114-24. The White Paper concedes that determining the standard
for service provider liability "is a difficult issue, with colorable arguments on both
sides." Id. at 114. It also assumes, however, that any standard other than strict
liability for direct infringement "would be a significant departure from current
copyright principles and law and would result in a substantial derogation of the
rights of copyright owners." Id. In fact, the question is far from well-settled. For a
further discussion of service provider liability, see infra notes 262-64 and accompanying text.
The bulk of the White Paper's discussion of on-line service provider liability is
devoted to justifying the imposition of strict liability for direct infringement. At
points in its discussion, however, the White Paper offers justifications that are more
appropriate to a discussion of vicarious liability. WHrrE PAPER, supra note 10, at
117-18. The White Paper also misleadingly suggests that those held vicariously liable "are not held to strict liability, but rather to a higher threshold for liability." Id.
at 115. It is, of course, true that one party will be held vicariously liable for the
"fault" of another only where there is a "right and ability" to supervise the faulty
party. But a finding of a "right and ability" to supervise is not tantamount to a
finding of an unreasonable failure to supervise (i.e., negligence). Further, where
the basis for the "faulty" party's liability is itself strict liability for harm done, as it is
in the case of direct copyright infringement, vicarious liability may be imposed in
the absence of any actual "fault" (i.e., negligence or intentional misconduct) on
the part of anyone.
262. See Samuelson, Copyright Grab, supra note 239, at 136, 190-91 (questioning
technical feasibility of on-line services to continuously monitor user accounts).
263. Id. at 190.
264. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
(1994)).
265. See WHrrE PAPER, supra note 10, at 120-22 (discussing Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993), and Sega Enters., Ltd. v.
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In a more recent trial court case, which was decided after the White
Paper was issued and specifically ruled on the issue of on-line service provider liability for direct infringement, the court cited both
of the cases the White Paper relied on and the White Paper itself,
but nevertheless declined to hold either a BBS operator or an Internet access provider directly liable for a user's uploading of copy2 66
righted material onto their servers.
The court concluded that BBS operators and on-line access
providers could be held liable in such a case only on the basis of (1)
contributory infringement, if they had knowledge of the infringing
activity and materially contributed to it or (2) vicarious liability, if
they had both the right and the ability to control the user and re26 7
ceived a direct financial benefit from the infringing activity.

If the scope of the reproduction right were actually as clear-cut
and sweeping as the White Paper claims, there would arguably be
little need to propose amendments expanding any of the other exclusive rights of the copyright holder. Yet, that is exactly what the
White Paper proceeds to do. Its first specific proposed amendment
of the 1976 Copyright Act would "expressly recognize that copies or
phonorecords of works can be distributed to the public by transmis-

MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994)). Both cases were brought against
BBS operators. As the White Paper itself concedes, the Playboy case was actually
based on a finding of infringement of the distribution right, apparently because of
the court's "uncertainty whether the operator of the bulletin board system could
itself be held to have reproduced a work that was (a) uploaded by one subscriber
and (b) downloaded by another." Id. at 68. It also concedes that the Sega case was
based, at least in part, on a finding of contributory infringement-i.e., the "BBS
operator ... sold special copiers, the 'only substantial use' of which was to copy
Sega's copyrighted video games." Id. at 114 (citing Sega. 857 F. Supp. at 685).
266. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907
F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The court first disposes of the two cases relied on
in the White Paper, finding that neither provides a basis for a finding of direct
infringement of the reproduction right by either the BBS operator or the service
provider. Id. at 1370-71. Then, the court notes its disagreement with the Sega case,
to the extent that Sega "holds that BBS operators are directly liable for copyright
infringement when users upload infringing works to their systems." Id. at 1371
n.17. The court goes on to classify the holding as dicta "as there was evidence that
the defendant knew of the infringing uploads by users and, in fact, actively encouraged such activity" thus suggesting that the Sega decision was in fact based on a
finding of contributory infringement. Id.
267. Id. at 1373-77. With respect to the vicarious liability of the on-line service
provider, the court discusses at length what is meant by "direct financial benefit"
and ultimately concludes that, because the plaintiffs "failed to raise a question of
fact on this vital element, their claim of vicarious liability fails." Id. at 1377. It also
rules in favor of the BBS operator as a matter of law, thus leaving for trial only the
issue of the on-line service provider's potential liability for contributory infringement. Id. at 1381.
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sion, and that such transmissions fall within the exclusive distribu2' 68
tion right of the copyright owner.
To be sure, "[i]t is not [entirely] clear under the current law
that a transmission... constitute [s] a distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work."2 69 As the White Paper concedes, "the right to
distribute copies of a work has traditionally covered [only] the right
to convey a possessory interest in a tangible copy of the work," and
is substantially circumscribed by the "first sale" doctrine, which limits the copyright owner's distribution right to the initial distribution
of a particular lawful copy of the copyrighted work.2 70 By contrast,
transmissions are treated under current copyright law merely as a
2 71
means of communicating a performance or display.
The application of the distribution right to digital transmissions, however, is no more uncertain than the application of the
reproduction right to works residing in a computer's RAM or to
BBS or on-line service or access providers whose subscribers upload
or download copyrighted works. For instance, one of the two cases
the White Paper cites for the proposition that a BBS operator directly infringes the reproduction right when its server is used by
subscribers to upload or download copyrighted works, in fact based
its finding of direct infringment on the distribution and public display rights, not on a violation of the reproduction right. 272 The

White Paper concedes that "[tihe court may not have focused on
the reproduction right, [precisely] because of its uncertainty
whether the operator of the bulletin board system [BBS] could itself be held to have reproduced a work that was (a) uploaded by
2 73
one subscriber and (b) downloaded by another."
In short, the White Paper is highly selective about which uncertainties in existing U.S. copyright law it would like Congress to address. That very selectivity makes critics suspicious about the White
Paper's motivation in proposing that the distribution right be
268. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 213.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 68-69. The "first sale" doctrine is codified in the Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 109 (1994). Section 109 lists two exceptions to the first sale doctrine,
which in effect endows the copyright holder with an exclusive right to authorize
the rental of computer programs or sound recordings. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1) (a).
These exceptions implicitly recognize that the primary purpose of such rentals is
to make unauthorized copies of the copyrighted work.
271. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining term "transmit" as communication of
"a performance or display.., by any device or process whereby images or sounds
are received beyond the place from which they are sent").
272. For a discussion of one of the cases the White Paper cites (Playboy), see
supra note 265 and accompanying text.
273. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 68 (footnote omitted).
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amended so as to expressly apply to transmissions. The White Paper's explanation for its proposed amendment is that there is sim-

ply "no reason to treat works that are distributed in copies to the

public by means of transmission differently than works distributed
in copies to the public by other, more conventional means,"2 74 particularly given that, "[i]n the future, transmission may become the
conventional means of distribution."2 75

Critics, however, suggest that "the real purpose behind the proposed digital transmission right is to enable copyright owners to
control all digital performances and displays of copyrighted works,
without regard to whether they are public or private." 276 The White
274. Id. at 216.

275. Id.
276. See NIl Intelectual Property Report, supra note 239, at 23. The White Paper's only reference to the effect that its proposed amendment of the distribution
right will have on the public performance right is concerned entirely with assuring
owners of the latter right that the new distribution right will not in any way diminish the economic value of the existing public performance right. See WHrTE PAPER,
supra note 10, at 214 n.536. The White Paper nowhere acknowledges that any
public interest is being served by the current limitation of the exclusive performance right to "public" performances. Nor does it ever acknowledge that its proposal to classify transmissions as a form of distribution might have the practical effect
of extending the overall scope of copyright protection to nonpublic as well as public performances.
The White Paper does make oblique footnote reference to the fact that "[t ] he
term 'public' as used in connection with the distribution right is not coincident
with the meaning assigned to that term in connection with the public performance
or public display right." Id, at 215 n.540. The definition of "publication" in § 101
of the Copyright Act makes it clear that "[a] public performance or display of a
work does not of itself constitute publication." 17 U.S.C. § 101. The converse,
however, is also true; just because a transmission does not happen to constitute a
'public" performance does not mean that the transmission will not constitute
a
"public" distribution. A performance or display is "public" only if (1) it occurs
"at
a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons
outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered" or
(2) it is transmitted or otherwise communicated to such a place or to the public.
Id. (defining "publicly"). Thus, a transmission to a place not open to the public,
where only a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered, will
not constitute a public performance under existing law, but may constitute a public distribution under the proposed amendment.
The White Paper does insist that "the transmission of a copyrighted work from
one person to another in a private e-mail message would not constitute a distribution to the public." WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 215. Yet, despite its own previous assertions about what constitutes an infringing reproduction of a work in a
computer and what constitutes a direct infringement of the reproduction right by
an on-line service or access provider, it fails to consider that any on-line service or
access provider who facilitates the transmission of that e-mail message could be
held liable for reproducing the work in its own computer if the message remained
there for more than a "very brief period," whether or not the further distribution
of that copy to the receiver constitutes a public distribution. For a discussion of
what constitutes infringing reproduction, see supra notes 244-66 and accompanying text. Indeed, the White Paper makes this exact argument by way of explaining
that the "first sale" doctrine will, in effect, not apply to distributions by transmis-
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Paper, in effect, concedes that this new digital distribution right will
in fact be different from the more conventional distribution ight,
when it asserts that distribution by transmission will be unencumbered by the "first sale" doctrine that limits the distribution right in
other contexts.2 77 According to the White Paper, unauthorized distribution by transmission, unlike more conventional distributions,
will necessarily involve electronic "copying," and thus a violation of
the reproduction right, which (unlike the distribution right) is not
2 78
limited by the first sale doctrine.
The White Paper proposes adding two new provisions to the
U.S. copyright law that are equally controversial. One provision
would make it illegal to import, manufacture or distribute any device or service, the "primary purpose or effect of which is to...
circumvent... any ...system [such as encryption] which prevents
or inhibits the violation of any of the exclusive rights under Section
106."279 This provision would in effect legislatively overrule the ju-

dicially developed test for contributory infringement, which requires that a device have no substantial noninfringing uses.28 0 As
Part II of this Article has pointed out, not all attempts to bypass
copy-protection or other security systems are necessarily illegitimate. Yet, this provision is so broad that it could be interpreted as
prohibiting virtually any device designed to aid in the decompilation of mass-marketed computer programs. 2 81 Object-code, after
all, is arguably a kind of encryption system which prevents or inhibits the translation of the program into human-readable form and
the preparation of other derivative works.
The second new copyright provision that the White Paper recommends would make it illegal to knowingly remove or alter any
sion. WHrrE PAPER, supra note 10, at 95 ("[T] ransmission by means of current
technology involves both the reproduction of the work and the distribution of that
production.").
277. For the White Paper's claim that distribution by transmission should not
be treated differently from other distributions, see WHrrE PAPER, supra note 10, at
92-95.
278. For a critique of the White Paper's assertion that electronic transmissions necessarily involve reproduction, even when a work merely resides momentarily in a computer's memory, see supra notes 250-59 and accompanying text.
279. WHrrE PAPER, supra note 10, at 230.
280. See e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
440 (1984) (reasoning that manufacturers of staple articles of commerce that are
capable of substantial noninfringing uses should not be held liable as contributory
infringers).
281. See Samuelson, Copyright Grab, supra note 239, at 190 (noting White Paper's endorsement of changes in commercial law to validate common terms in
shrink-wrap licenses, including prohibitions on decompilation).
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copyright management information, knowingly distribute or import
copyright management information which has been altered, or
knowingly distribute or import works from which copyright management information has been removed.2 82 This provision becomes less innocuous when one discovers that "copyright
management information" is defined to include not only the name
and other identifying information of the author or copyright owner
of the work, but also any terms and conditions for uses of the
work.2 83 The latter phrase apparently prohibits the removal of electronic "shrink-wrap licenses," suggesting that the White Paper believes that such terms can constitute a valuable and enforceable
copyright management tool, at least in an NII environment.2 8 4 The
provision becomes even less innocuous when it is understood that
copyright management information systems could include "smart"
systems that would "have the ability to secretly report back to the
copyright owner via the network on what the user was doing with
the work, and the ability to search the consumer's hard disk and
report back on what else was there." 28 5 This is apparently the very
282.

WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 235-36.
283. Id. at 235.
284. Id. (stating that "copyright management information ... may be critical
to the efficient operation and successes of NII"). That impression is confirmed in
the White Paper's discussion of on-line licensing transactions, where the White
Paper asserts that "on-line licenses should be encouraged because they offer efficiency for both licensors and licensees." Id. at 58. It also asserts that:
[S]tate validating statutes-similar to those used to validate shrink wrap
licenses-can be used for on-line licenses to help overcome concerns regarding adhesion; and such statutes should not be preempted as long as
they do not attempt to grant rights equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright.
Id. at 58-59. For a recent appellate decision echoing that view, see ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), discussed supra note 145. For an argument that shrink-wrap license restrictions on reverse engineering do grant rights
equivalent to those within the general scope of copyright and thus are preempted
under section 301 of the Copyright Act, and may also undermine the policies of
federal patent law, see McManis, supra note 106, at 88-95. For a discussion of
shrink-wrap contracts in cyberspace, compare Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 JURIMETRiCS J. 311 (1995) with Robert L. Dunne, Deterring Unauthorized
Access to Computers: Behavior in Cyberspace Through a Contract Law Paradigm, 35
JURIMETRIcsJ.

1 (1994).

285. Samuelson, Copyright Grab, supra note 239, at 188. One example of a
smart system is a software device called a "cookie." For a technical description of
cookies, see http://www.netscape.com/newsref/std/cookiespec.html, which describes a cookie as "a general mechanism which server side connections ... can use
to both store and retrieve information on the client side of the connection." This
same technical discussion goes on to describe how "cookies" work:
A server, when returning an HTTP object to a client, may also send a
piece of state information which the client will store. Included in that
state object is a description of the range of URLs for which that state is
valid. Any future HTTP requests made by the client which fall in that
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type of copyright management system that the White Paper had in
mind when it suggests that "technological means of tracking transrange will include a transmittal of the current value of the state object
from the client back to the server.
Id.
An on-line discussion of the risk to privacy posed by "cookies" can be found at
http://www.utopia.com/mailing/rre/HTTP.cookie.privacy.risk.html. The on-line
discussion of the HTrP cookie privacy risk includes the following report from one
computer user:
I recently installed Netscape 3.0b4, a beta [i.e. test] version, to try out the
new (compared to LIN) features ....
One of the new features, a security feature strangely categorized as a
.network" feature, queries the user before allowing "cookies" to be set.
Out of curiosity I set it so as to find out how often this feature was
invoked....
I was surprised to find that every night for the last two weeks after
enabling this I've been handed a "cookie" by a site I never knowingly
visited, at http://ad.doubleclick.net.
Upon visiting this site I discovered they engage in attempts to collect
various data about web users including their o/s [operating systems].
Why they feel it necessary to "ping" me each night to set a cookie I do not
know, but it seems they are also collecting data about browser usage.
Such a statistic regarding times online while in a browser would seem
valuable from a marketing standpoint.
While cookies may be useful when voluntary and insofar as they may
be helpful to the user ....[c]ookies from marketing companies benefit
me not.
Catagorize this as a risk to users of older netscapes lacking the conditional-cookie setting?
http://www.utopia.com/mailing/rre/HP.cookie.privacy.risk.html.
An on-line
discussion of the risk to privacy posed by a software device called a "cookie" can
currently be found at http://www.utopia.com/mailings/rre/HTTP.cookie.privacy.
risk.html.
For a more sanguine account of the use of cookies, see Thomas E. Weber,
Marketers' Tracking Methods May Not Be Causefor Panic, THE WALL ST. J. INTERACTIVE
EDrrION, June 27, 1996, who nevertheless concedes that the use of cookies is
controversial:
With cookies, which have come into use only in recent months, a
Web site places a tiny file on a visitor's computer that serves as a kind of
tracking beacon. The site doesn't know your name or e-mail address, but
it does know that you represent a distinct user. (Curious? Search your
hard drive for a file called "cookies" and open it in a word-processing
program to see who has served you a cookie).
Cookies feed some of the more dire privacy scenarios. With them, a
Web magazine can see which articles you read; a merchant can tell not
only which products you bought, but also which product descriptions you
simply viewed....
Still, some of these fears are no doubt overblown. To begin, surfing
is an anonymous activity, and cookies can't automatically penetrate that
shield. When you visit a Web site, the computer maintaining that site
may know your domain, but it can't know your identity, or even your email address, unless you volunteer it. Of course, plenty of sites that sell
products on-line require names, addresses, e-mail addresses and credit
card information. Providing it, however, is your choice.
Id. Still, one wonders how many Web users who have provided such information
are aware that "cookie" technology may have been implanted in their computers.
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actions and licensing will lead to reduced application and scope of
2 86
the fair use doctrine."
Yet, as one critic points out, the White Paper "contains no
promises that consumers will be charged lower prices in exchange
for giving up fair use, first sale, and other rights."2 87 In the view of
this critic, "[h]istory teaches us to be skeptical about claims that
giving publishers broad monopoly rights will be in the public interest."2 88 There is said to be no particular reason to believe that the
grant of strong copyright protection for digital works will necessar289
ily result in ubiquitous access and low prices.
In addition to proposing specific amendments to U.S. copyright law, the White Paper comments at length on the international
implications of the emerging global information superhighway.
The White Paper cautions that the existing international system of
copyright protection could make electronic commerce over the
global information infrastructure (GII) "difficult unless the United
States moves promptly to identify needs for protection and initiates
efforts to work toward a new level of international copyright
2 90
harmonization."
In the discussion that follows, it becomes clear that what the
White Paper means by working "toward a new level of international
copyright harmonization" is utilizing its proposed revisions of U.S.
copyright law as a blueprint for developing new international
norms. For example, the White Paper specifically asserts that "work
on a Berne Protocol and New Instrument should focus on issues
not addressed in TRIPS, such as protection of rights management
information, the use of technical security measures and the prohibition of devices and services whose primary purpose or effect is to
defeat technical security measures." 29 1 The White Paper claims that
"[o]ne of the most important issues for international norm setting
286.

WHITE PAPER,

supra note 10, at 82.

287. Samuelson, Copyright Grab, supra note 239, at 191.
288. Id.
289. Id.; cf. Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 59, at 2496-97 (expressing
somewhat analogous concern that Database Directive might "confer exorbitant
market power on first comers," and noting that "the harsh conditions and high
prices that electronic database publishers increasingly impose on users everywhere,
including institutional users such as libraries and research organizations, have al-

ready alarmed the United States Office of Technology Assessment.");

OFFICE OF

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
FINDING A BALANCE: COMPUTER
SoFwARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE 177-79 (1992) (noting high subscription fees, user charges, etc.).

290. WHrE PAPER, supra note 10, at 131.
291. Id. at 149.
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is to define the nature of a dissemination of a work or a transmis2 92
sion of a work in digital form."
In the course of discussing international harmonization, the
White Paper also makes two other salient-if not entirely consistent-points. First, the White Paper emphasizes that the principle
of national treatment is the cornerstone of the Paris and Berne
Conventions and is also a keystone of international trade agree293
ments, such as GATT and the recently established WTO.
Although conceding "that there is some controversy over the scope
of the national treatment obligation under the Berne Convention
and its application to what some [countries] may regard as newly
created rights and subject matter,"29 4 the White Paper nevertheless
takes the position that intellectual property rights "must unequivocally be granted in national legislation fully on the basis of national
treatment for all rights and benefits."2 9 5 At an absolute minimum,
the White Paper says, national treatment must apply to the minimum obligations established in any WIPO-sponsored Berne Con96
vention protocol or New Instrument.
The obvious targets of these remarks are the various European
countries which currently grant foreign nationals protection for a
variety of so-called "neighboring rights"-soon to include the new
sui generis database right-solely on the basis of material reciprocity.29 7 By contrast, the White Paper points out that recent "U.S.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 140.
294. Id. at 148.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 150.
297. See Samuelson, Intellectual Property, supra note 80, at 25. Samuelson
points out that:
[S]ome member nations of the EU, such as France, require payment of
royalties to authors of motion pictures when videotapes are rented.
These royalties, however, are unavailable to non-EU authors unless they
are from countries having an equivalent law. Because the U.S. gives owners of copyrights in motion pictures the right to control sales of videocassettes but not rentalsof them, U.S. film producers are ineligible to receive
royalties arising from video rentals in European countries that have
adopted this reciprocity-based rule.

Id.
The White Paper itself notes that public performance rights in sound recordings are also granted in many countries and that "[d] ue to the lack of a performance right in the United States, U.S. performers and record companies are denied

their fair share of foreign royalty pools for the public performance of U.S. sound
recordings in some countries and are in danger of losing access to their share in
others." WHrrE PAPER, supra note 10, at 222-23. For that reason, the White Paper

concludes that an amendment to U.S. copyright law, granting "[a] full public performance right-particularly with respect to all digital transmissions-is warranted." Id. at 225.
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copyright legislation has granted rights that some other nations
may regard as new rights beyond those set forth in the Berne Convention-for example, rental rights in computer programs, sound
recordings... [and] musical works embodied in sound recordings
.... [and] a system of royalties on blank digital audio recording

media and digital audio recorders" yet has done so exclusively on
298
the basis of national treatment.
In declaring that the United States believes the grant of national treatment to be consistent with its obligations under the
Berne Convention and other international intellectual property
and trade treaties and agreements, 2 99 the White Paper conveniently
ignores the (now moot) question whether extending semiconductor chip design protection to foreign nationals on the basis of material reciprocity was consistent with the national treatment
3 00
obligations of the United States under the Paris Convention.
Still, the clear implication of the White Paper's remark is that the
United States currently takes the view that the grant of intellectual
property protection on the basis of material reciprocity is inconsistent with the national treatment provisions of the Paris and Berne
Conventions and TRIPS. Thus, while the White Paper expresses a
willingness to consider a sui generis unfair extraction right for
databases as a supplement to copyright protection and urges that
the Database Directive be carefully evaluated,30 1 it also seems to reserve the right to invoke the WTO dispute settlement process to
challenge material reciprocity provisions such as the one contained
in the Database Directive should a proposed Berne Protocol and
302
New Instrument not moot the issue.
At the same time, however, the White Paper also emphasizes a
second point-namely that "[a] n important aspect of the participation of foreign entities through a GII in the U.S. domestic information infrastructure is the provision of adequate and effective
intellectual property protection in the country wishing to participate."3 03 The White Paper notes that "[t]o the extent that participation in the NII can be linked to the provision of intellectual
property protection, it will promote the ability of U.S. businesses to
298. Id. at 151.
299. Id.
300. For a discussion of national treatment obligations under the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention, see supra note 222-23 and accompanying text.
301. WHrrE PAPER, supra note 10, at 153.
302. For a discussion of the argument that the United States might make, see
supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
303. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 131-32.
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use the Nil and the GII to disseminate works to foreign consumers
via other countries' information infrastructures."3 04 It finds it necessary to add, however, that "[in considering linkages, careful
consideration will have to be given to obligations under international intellectual property treaties and other international
3 05
agreements."
This last remark appears to be an oblique reference to what is
surely the single most controversial question that is likely to confront the WTO dispute settlement process-namely whether and to
what extent the United States can lawfully continue to take or
threaten unilateral action under "Special 301" of the U.S. Trade Act
to remedy what it conceives to be inadequate or ineffective intellectual property protection in another country. On the one hand,
some commentators contend that the effect of Article 23 of the
1994 Understanding "is not only to make any retaliatory action
taken by the United States under Section 301 explicitly inconsistent
with the GATT, but also to make investigations of possible GATT
breaches conducted under Section 301 illegal."3 0 6 On the other
hand, in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Congress specifically
amended "Special 301" to state that "[a] foreign country may be
determined to deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, notwithstanding the fact that the foreign country may be in compliance with the specific obligations of
[TRIPS] .307
Thus, the stage seems set for an inevitable international showdown on the question whether the United States can utilize "Special 301" procedures to pressure other countries to adopt
intellectual property provisions more extensive than those required
by TRIPS. While there is no way of knowing exactly what "hot-button" issue will trigger this showdown or how it will be handled in
the WTO dispute resolution process, the dispute itself seems highly
likely to arise in the not too distant future. At the moment, the
304. Id. at 132.
305. Id.
306. McDorman, supra note 89, at 124. McDorman quotes still other commentators who point out that: "It is indeed hard to see why many states should
accept new multilateral commitments in this area [intellectual property] if they
remain vulnerable to unilateral actions." Id. (citing David Hartridge & Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Proprty Rights: The Issues in GATT, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
893, 909 (1989)).
307. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 313, Stat.
(1994) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2242(d) (4) (Supp. 1996)). For a further discussion of the Uruguay Round Agreements, see supra notes 4, 99 and accompanyaing text.
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possible Berne Protocol and New Instrument currently being discussed by the United States and European Union seems to be the
most likely candidate to trigger the showdown. Of course, because
any actual U.S. retaliation, such as an "increase in duties or imposition of quantitative restrictions on imports," will likely be held to be
a violation of Articles I, II or XI of GATr,O8 the very prospect of a
confrontation may have a tempering effect on how the United
States goes about ensuring the adequacy of intellectual property
protection on the emerging global information superhighway.
If it does not, the potential for more, rather than less, international conflict over intellectual property protection is great, particularly if the Berne Protocol and New Instrument finally hammered
out is widely perceived as essentially a bilateral bargain between the
United States and the European Union at the expense of the rest of
the world. Any attempt on the part of the United States to impose
such an agreement on unwilling third-party countries by means of
threatened unilateral trade sanctions will undoubtedly be challenged. 30 9 The likely timing of that dispute could hardly be worse,
as it will probably coincide with the expiration of the transition period that TRIPS provides to developing countries and will thus arise
just as TRIPS implementation by the developing world is creating
3 10
its own (possibly serious) economic dislocations.
308. SeeJudith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, GATTDispute Settlement Agreement:
InternationalizationorEliminationof Section 301 ? 26 Ir.'L LAw. 795, 799-800 (1992).
Bello and Holmer note that while GATT Dispute Settlement Agreement does "internationalize" section 301, in the sense that it provides "dramatically more effective international enforcement against unfair traders," it also "diminishes the
credibility of the threat of unilateral retaliation by the United States under section
301." Id. at 799. The reason for this is simple:
Any such retaliation-consisting in all cases to date of either an increase
in duties or imposition of quantitive restrictions on imported goods-is
likely to be in violation of GATT articles I, II, or XI, or all three. If the
United States takes such action without GATT authorization, then it is
likely to be challenged. And, if challenged, the United States' retaliation
is likely to be found in violation of the GATT.
Id, at 800 (footnotes omitted).
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., Sumner J. La Croix, The Rise of Global Intellectual Property Rights
and Their Impact on Asia, in AsIA PACIFIC ISSUES 1995 (Analysis from the East-West
Center Series Nov. 23, 1995). La Croix notes that although government officials in
the West have long contended that Asia-Pacific countries and other developing
nations would benefit from stronger intellectual property rights, new theoretical
and empirical work in economics does not support this view. Id. at 2. For example, one empirical study cited by La Croix found that variations in intellectual
property protection have little impact on foreign investment. Id. at 4 (citing Keith
Maskus & Denise Eby Konan, Trade-Related IntellectualProperty Rights: Issues and Exploratoty Results, in ANALYTricAL AND NEGOTIATING ISSUES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING
SYSTEM 401, 438-39 (Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern eds., 1994)). A particularly striking conclusion of a second, theoretical economic study that La Croix cites
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Yet, the prospect for a balanced international agreement on
the global information superhighway is not entirely favorable. In
the international debate over interoperability, the European Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, buttressed by a
number of timely U.S. court decisions, managed to achieve a much
more appropriate balance between the interests of software industry leaders and second-comers than would the position that the
United States government has been advocating.3 1 1 In the debate
over the global information infrastructure (GII), by contrast, the
United States and the European Union are both vigorously promoting the interests of their own favored constituencies of content
providers, with little concern for other constituencies interested in
the emerging GII. Consequently, the proposed Berne Protocol and
New Instrument may well fail to achieve an appropriate balance between the interests of digital content providers, on the one hand,
and the interests of on-line service and access providers, and the
ultimate users of digital information, on the other.
is that "the developing country never gains from stronger intellectual property regimes until it is ready to engage in research and development at the frontiers of
knowledge." La Croix, supra, at 1-8 (citing Elhanan Helpman, Innovation, Imita-

tion, and IntellectualProperty Rights, 61 ECONOMETRiCA 1247 (1993)). La Croix's own
studies suggest that:
[F]oreign pressure to strengthen [intellectual property rights) . . .may
benefit some more-advanced developing countries, such as Singapore
and South Korea ....

In other countries, such as Indonesia, foreign

pressure to adopt a stronger [intellectual property rights] regime may be
premature, as no sector has the potential to develop new frontier technologies. In this case, Helpman's analysis applies: foreign pressure produces
a gain in the welfare of the developed country but a loss in the welfare of
the developing country.
Id.
La Croix also cites two empirical studies of his own on the pharmaceutical
industries in Japan and South Korea, which show that "the effect of stronger intellectual property rights will vary greatly depending on the nature of a country's
industry." See Akihiko Kawaura & Sumner J. La Croix, Japan'sShift from Process to
ProductPatents in the PharmaceuticalIndusty: An Event Study of the Impact on Japanese

Firms, 33 ECON. INQUIRY 89 (1995) (noting value ofJapanese drug companies actually went up by 25% when patent protection for pharmaceutical was strengthened);
Sumner J. La Croix & Akihiko Kawaura, Product Patent Reform and Its Impact on
Korea's PharmaceuticalIndus", INT'L ECON. Rv. (forthcoming) (noting value of
South Korean pharmaceutical firms went down 61% over 14-month transition period for strengthening pharmaceutical patent protection). In any event, says La
Croix, it seems clear that some developing countries will see short-term losses as
additional royalty payments to foreign firms push consumer prices higher without
producing more foreign investment or higher expenditures on research and development. La Croix, supra, at 5.
311. For a discussion of the EC Directive, see supra note 8 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the U.S. government's position on interoperability, see
supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
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Some visionaries claim, however, that the attempt to protect
intellectual property on the emerging global information superhighway is itself doomed to inevitable failure. They argue that the
changes being wrought by digital technologies-which many describe as the greatest innovation in information technology since
the invention of moveable type in the fifteenth century-raise the
distinct possibility that copyright law itself will become an anachro31 2
nism, unless its fundamental premises are rethought and revised.
The challenge posed by digital technology is said to be that it is
"detaching information from the physical plane, where property
law of all sorts has always found definition."3 1 3 Even intellectual
property law, which purports to protect intangible works of the intellect, creates rights of invention and authorship that have traditionally adhered to activities in the physical world. Its value has
been embodied in the physical conveyance rather than the
3 14
thoughts conveyed-the bottle, as it were, rather than the wine.
But in cyberspace, the physical bottles are said to be vanishing.
Eventually:
[A]ll of the goods of the Information Age-all of the expressions once contained in books or film strips or newsletters-will exist either as pure thought or something
very much like thought: voltage conditions darting around
the Net at the speed of light, in conditions that one might
behold in effect, as glowing pixels or transmitted sound,
but never touch or claim to "own" in the old sense of the
15
word.3
As the bottles disappear, innovators are beginning to lay claim to
the ideas themselves and not merely their expression and have
taken to "patenting abstractions, sequences of virtual events, and
31 6
mathematical formulae-the most unreal estate imaginable."
312. See Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia A. Krauthaus, Copyrighton the Information Superhighway: Requiem for a Middleweight, 6 STAN. L. & POL'v REv. 25, 26 (1994)
(stating that "the focus of the copyright legal system is poorly fitted to the world of
modern electronic information sytems").
313. John P. Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Frameworkfor Rethinking Patents
and Copyrights in the Digital Age (Everything You Know about Intellectual Property is
Wrong), WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84, 85.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. See generally Cohen, supra note 137, at 1153-63 (discussing "profusion
of slippery slopes" in judicial attempts to isolate patentable subject matter in
software patent claims).
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Compounding the dilemma for traditional intellectual property law, digital technology is also erasing national boundaries, "replacing them with the unbounded and perhaps permanently
lawless waves of cyberspace."3 17 In this virtual world, the debate
over national treatment versus material reciprocity in the grant of
intellectual property rights seems to have virtually no relevance.
In the face of such daunting technological changes, we are said
to be sailing into the future on a sinking jurisprudential shipnamely, the accumulated canon of copyright and patent law, which
was "developed to convey forms and methods of expression very
318
different from the vaporous cargo it is now being asked to carry."
Indeed, it is not so much that the ship is sinking; it is just that commerce on the emerging global information superhighway will not
319
be using this (or any) ship.
At the very least, intellectual property law, both domestic and
international, may stand in need of radical reconfiguration to meet
the demands of the digital age. Commentators have already begun
suggesting what some of these modifications may entail.
One author has identified the following consequences that digital technology will have for copyright law. First, the classification
of copyrighted works into discrete subject-matters may no longer be
relevant or necessary, as the convergence of technology and the detachment of information from the physical plane makes the traditional classifications obsolete.320 Second, a new concept of
authorship may be required to take into account computer generated works compiled from pre-existing works. 32 ' Third, a collective
method of enforcement and licensing may be necessary. 322 Fourth,
a new exclusive right to prevent "access" to the work may be in or317. Barlow, supra note 313, at 84.
318. Id.
319. For a discussion of the economic effects of digitization on intellectual
property, see infra notes 326-31 and accompanying text.
320. For a discussion of economic rights and the classification of copyright
subject-matters, see Christie, supra note 1, at 524-25.
321. Christie, supra note 1, at 524-25; see generally THE CONSTRUCTION OF AuTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LrrERATURE (Martha Woodmansee
& PeterJaszi eds., 1994) (discussing legal development of concept of authorship).
322. Christie, supra note 1, at 525. Christie notes that:
One of the recommendations of the Japanese Institute of Intellectual
Property in its 1994 report entitled 'Exposure '94-A proposal of the new
rule on intellectual property for Multimedia' ... is for the establishment
of a 'Digital Information Center', to act as a clearing house to administer
voluntary licences to use copyright works in the creation of multimedia
products..
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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der, though such a right might be tantamount to an exclusive right
to prevent any unauthorized use of the work.32 3 Fifth and finally
(albeit paradoxically), it may be that none of these changes, or for
that matter any copyright protection at all, will be necessary to protect digital works.
It may well be that a combination of technological restrictions
(such as encryption), contractual arrangements and criminal sanctions (for unauthorized decryption) -which is to say, classic trade
secret protection-will provide more than sufficient (i.e., too
much) protection to content providers.32 4 The more difficult intellectual property question could turn out to be how to avoid the
problem of over-protection. For example, should digital content
providers be able to protect, or should second-comers be able to
reverse engineer, encrypted but uncopyrightable (i.e., public domain or purely functional) works? And how can the reverse engineer (or for that matter the public at large) know in advance
whether encrypted information is a legitimate subject for copyright
or trade secret protection?
It is equally paradoxical that while this combination of trade
secret-like protection may turn out to be more than sufficient to
enable content providers to control the pricing of their digital
products, they will nevertheless be operating in an increasingly
competitive marketplace in which much of the intellectual property
will increasingly be distributed free as suppliers of digital information proliferate.32 5 In the new economic environment of cyberspace, it is predicted that a new set of economic rules will apply,
chief among which is that "content is free:"
While not all content will be free, the new economic dynamic will operate as if it were. In the world of the Net,
content (including software) will serve as advertising for
services such as support, aggregation, filtering, assembly
and integration of content modules, or training of custom32 6
ers in their use.

323. Id. at 526; see also Litman, supra note 246, at 34 (examining intellectual
property bargain from public's vantage point).
324. Christie, supra note 1, at 526. For contrasting views over the use of contract law in cyberspace, compare Lemley, supra note 132 with Dunne, supra note
284.
325. See Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value, WIRED, July 1995, at 136. As Dyson
notes, these trends are already beginning to play out. For example, the producers
of the two leading Internet software search products, Netscape and Microsoft Internet Explorer, recently began free distribution of their products.
326. Id. at 137.
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Already, empirical evidence can be found to support this
327
prediction.
In this brave new world of free content, content providers will
be rewarded primarily "for personal effort-process and servicesrather than for mere ownership of assets."328 While much of the
value added by these services will take the form of "incremental innovation bearing know-how on its face,"32 9 much value will also reside in the certification of authenticity and reliability, rather than in
content itself.3 3 0 This latter type of value, of course, is precisely
what has traditionally been protected by the fourth and final major
category of intellectual property law-namely the law of trademarks
1
and trade names.38
This suggests that in cyberspace, trademark, trade name and
trade secret protection may largely supplant the law of copyrights
and patents as the dominant forms of intellectual property protection. The irony, of course, is that, strictly speaking, neither trademarks and trade names, nor trade secrets can be called intellectual
property, as they merely represent the economic value of an innovator's commercial reputation and commercial privacy, respectively.3 3 2 Thus, the primary legal consequence of digital
technology's detachment of information from the physical plane
may well be that the subject of intellectual property protection in
cyberspace will no longer be conceived of as "property" at all, but
rather as the economic value of the public and private spheres of
innovative activity. In a word, the law of digital intellectual property
may eventually be replaced by a law of digital unfair competition.
International harmonization of the law of unfair competition
and specifically the law of trademarks, trade names and trade
secrets should prove to be a far less daunting task than the current
effort to harmonize international copyright and patent law. Admittedly, it will not always be easy to decide what should be considered
private and public, or whether and to what extent an innovator's
reputation or incentive to innovate has been economically impaired as a result of unfair competition and what relief will repair
327. See, e.g., Peter H. Lewis, Microsoft Offering News Without Charge on Internet,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1996, at D4 ("[T] here will be no subscription charge for access
... [but] Microsoft and its partners can expect to reap potentially large revenues
from advertising .... ").
328. Dyson, supra note 325, at 140.
329. Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 59, at 2444.
330. Id.
331. For a discussion of the law of trademarks and the interest it protects, see
supra note 65.
332. Reichman, supra note 59, at 2444.
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or eliminate the economic injury, without at the same time granting protection against legitimate competition.3 38 The task is magnitudes simpler, however, than attempting to define, much less
enforce, disembodied intellectual property rights.
Indeed, international harmonization of the law of unfair competition is already well underway. As we have seen, both the Paris
Convention and the TRIPS agreement contain provisions specifically defining various species of unfair competition and obliging
member countries to provide the nationals of other member countries effective protection against unfair competition. Article 10b of
the Paris Convention enumerates those unfair acts that are injurious to commercial reputation,3 34 while Article 39 of TRIPS delineates the requirements for obtaining legal protection of undisclosed
information.3 3 5 Although a need may well arise for a new form of
"portable trade secret protection," reaching an international consensus on the appropriate scope of that protection will be both conceptually simpler and politically more palatable if the sui generis
protection is consciously modelled on traditional trade secret law,
rather than being viewed as a diluted or hybrid form of copyright or
33 6
patent protection.
V.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing article reaches the following conclusions on
three interrelated subjects:
1. The TRIPS Agreement-Although the TRIPS agreement is an
important milestone in international intellectual property protection, its substantive significance for emerging computer technologies and the global information superhighway is quite limited. The
TRIPS agreement specifies that computer programs and compilations of data are to be protected as literary works under the older
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
but contains no provisions defining the precise scope of copyright
protection for computer programs or databases. TRIPS also does
not offer any explicit guidance on the patentability of computer
333. For a perceptive series of studies suggesting how these questions should
be addressed, see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
334. For a discussion of the definition of "unfair competition" under Article
10 b' of the Paris Convention, see supra note 33.
335. For a discussion of the protection of undisclosed information under Article 39, see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
336. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 59, at 2519-25 ("[S] trained applications of the patent and copyright paradigms... have led to the recurring cycles
of under- and overprotection ....").
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program related inventions. Thus, TRIPS contributes little of substance to either the ongoing "interoperability" debate or the emerging debate over the protection of intellectual property on the
information superhighway. Indeed, so profound are the substantive gaps in the TRIPS agreement that its most important contribution to the protection of emerging computer technologies and
intellectual property protection on the global information superhighway may well turn out to be the international dispute resolution procedures that it establishes.
2. The InteroperabilityDebate-Although the TRIPS agreement
itself does not address the issue of interoperability, a workable international consensus on the copyright and trade secret aspects of
the issue has arguably been reached and codified in the EC Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs. While international consensus over the appropriate scope of patent protection
for computer program-related inventions is developing more
slowly, such a consensus is most likely to be shaped by a nuanced
application of the traditional substantive patent law requirement
that a patentable invention consist of a product or process that is
novel, useful and nonobvious, and the procedural requirement that
the patent applicant make an enabling and best-mode disclosure of
the invention. On these points, the United States has the opportunity to play the same constructive role in forging a global consensus
that the European Union has played in the copyright and trade secret phases of the interoperability debate.
3. The Emerging Global Information Superhighway-Thus far, little in the way of any international consensus has emerged with respect to the appropriate scope of intellectual property protection
on the global information superhighway. In contrast to the EC Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, the newly
adopted Directive for the Protection of Databases does not reflect
any broad international consensus on either the need or the appropriate scope of protection for a new sui generis form of intellectual
property in data contained in a database. Similarly, the Clinton administration's White Paper has thus far provoked more controversy
than consensus over the appropriate scope of digital copyright protection. Even if these two initiatives do eventually find their way
into a new Berne Convention Protocol, the United States and European Union will nevertheless confront a formidable political challenge in persuading the rest of the world to abide by the protocol.
Ironically, any attempt to resort to the sort of coercive political pres-
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sure that produced the TRIPS agreement may now be prohibited by
that very agreement and the larger GATT/WTO framework.
Whatever the immediate outcome of efforts to enhance intellectual property protection on the global information superhighway, emerging digital technology and the global information
superhighway itself are eventually likely to work a far more
profound transformation on international intellectual property
protection. If intellectual property law is to have any relevance at
all in cyberspace, it first may be necessary to reconceive it as essentially a means of preventing unfair competition in the public and
private spheres of innovative digital activity.
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